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ABSTRACT
It is important to recognize that in a complex socio-economic struc-
ture that has developed with racism as part of its logic of existence,
there does not need to be a conspiracy in order for racism to occur. It
becomes an integral and pervasive aspect of the fabric of ongoing social
and economic processes. One of the strengths of capitalism has been its
innate ability to reproduce in increasingly more complex forms those in-
equities that were programmed into the system during the early stages of
its development.
Since its introduction as a blatantly oppressive social policy during
the early stages of capitalist development, racism has become interwoven
into the psycho-social fabric of American society and in turn galvanized as
an integral component of the capitalist development process. It is upon
this base that race develops the dual characteristics of a social and
economic class. Furthermore, it is this duality that has facilitated the
gradual transformation of racism from a conscious and deliberate policy of
oppression to the more elusive and seemingly autonomous institutional
forms that are still nonetheless oppressive. The point to be made is
quite clear. An effective attack on racism must also, necessarily,
attack the economic base upon which it is reproduced.
This thesis is an attempt to more clearly delineate particular his-
torical and contemporary dynamics, that through continued interaction have
reinforced the increasingly marginal status of the African-American work-
force. More specifically, the thesis maintains two objectives. The first
objective is to lay the foundation for a better understanding of those
factors that have given rise to the current state of affairs. The second
is to critically assess employment prospects for the African-American
workforce as determined by transformed labormarket conditions stemming
from the increased impacts of technological innovations. The goal is to
present, in realistic terms, a snapshot of the bottleneck confronting
laborforce advancement for the African-American population.
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INTRODUCTION
The current attack against the African-American population on
economic, political, and social fronts is rooted in 400 years of racism
and capitalist development in the United States. In spite of recent
civil and economic rights reforms, the marginal socio-economic status
of African-Americans is an American trademark that has remained virtually
unchanged over the past 40 years. And unless the basic structure of this
system along with its supportive institutions change, present conditions
will worsen dramatically over the next 40 years.
In a capitalist system, development is fundamentally driven by the
capital accumulation process, or in other words, the investment of in-
creasing rates of profit in more profit producing and capital creating
ventures. Consequently, the economic development, and more generally,
the standard of life for a particular race, class, or ethnic group, is
to a great extent determined by the level at which that group plugs into
the accumulation process. This general definition regarding the parameters
of political and economic development by way of access to the accumulation
process, is determined by two basic conditions.
Condition 1: This condition encompasses the degree to which dif-
ferent racial and ethnic groups were allowed to retain their cultures
and to establish a continuum of self-reliant economic and social support
mechanisms within their respective communities. These mechanisms provided
a base upon which the returns from community based economic activities
could be recycled towards the continued growth of the community; and a
base from which a protective political unity could be forged. It is
through this process that certain groups were able to corner a piece of
the accumulation and labor processes and assimilate into the mainstream.
Condition 2: The second condition is related to the stage of
capitalist development framing the internal development of the group in
question. More specifically, the degree of capital concentration and
monopolist penetration of both economic and political institutions, will
critically impact the rate at which the internal support mechanisms for
the group evolve, and the degree to which they are capable of integrating
with mainstream institutions. Very simply, the later a group plugs into
the process, the more difficult it becomes to leverage the economic and
political power necessary for development in a capitalist system.
A brief look at the historical development of the socio-economic
hierarchy shows that the mainstream power structure has granted varying
degrees of entitlement to different groups. This entitlement has an
historical base that is rooted in the prevailing social and economic con-
ditions surrounding a group's initial incorporation into the socio-economic
hierarchy. Entitlement,or the denial of it, can be summed up by three
broad categories: acceptance, alienation, or oppression. Here it is
appropriate to more clearly define the difference between alienation and
oppression. Alienation allows and practically dictates a level of self-
reliant development. Oppression, violently denies a group the right of
self-reliant development by sabotaging the development of necessary alter-
native economic and political support institutions. In this light,
genocide and slavery force a radically altered analysis of early develop-
ment for Native Americans and Africans, than the one required of
alienation and the earlier development/assimilation efforts of
European ethnics.
In short, the institution of American slavery necessarily required
that the components of African culture, the family, language, religion,
and values, be destroyed. The negation of those elements essential to
the building of a strong African based community insured the commodity
status of Africans as slaves, and secured favorable conditions for the
continued existence of slavery by eliminating a base for resistance.
Africans were a vital source of surplus value and profit for early
American capitalists. It was therefore necessary for these early capital-
ists to support the economic rationale behind slavery, with a social
rationale capable of legitimizing the human degradation of the African man
and women. It is upon this base that race develops the dual characteris-
tics of a social and economic class which frames the complexity confronting
liberation strategies for the African-American population today.
When viewed from a simplified economic perspective, slavery forced
the first Africans to endure the brunt of approximately eight generations
void of any significant levels of wealth accumulation that could have been
passed on to future generations. The absence of intergenerational develop-
ment cannot be isolated from the general flow of capitalist development
during this period. While Africans and their descendants were being
denied not only access to the accumulation process, but also legitimate
access to the labor process, capitalism was continually accelerating
through more advanced stages of development. And consistent with the
course of capitalist development, wealth and power were excessively concen-
trating within the ranks of a privileged class.
The initial and most devastating result of this process was not
the elimination of a base from which "negroes" or "blacks" could develop.
The most devastating result was the programmatic destruction of a po-
tential base from which Africans could have developed a viable community.
Such a base, however, presupposes a world that could not have existed,
especially when viewed from a global perspective that includes the
European colonization of Africans on the continent. Consequently the
economic legacy left to African-Americans has locked the population in
an endless cycle of "catching up." The following statistics identify
briefly the devastating impacts generations of economic isolation have
had on the African-American population.
A recent assessment from the State of Black America 1981 estimated
the total wealth owned by the African-American population at less than
3% of the national total. Shedding further light on the issue, Gary
Becker in his book, The Economics of Discrimination, calculated that the
total African-American ownership of productive capital approximated one
half of 1% of white ownership. H.S. Terrell in his article, "Wealth
Accumulation of Black and White Families: The Empirical Evidence,"
Journal of Finance (1971), lists the average net wealth of African-
American families at $3779 and that of white families at $20,153, resulting
in a ratio of 5.3 to 1. This figure, however, understates the magnitude
of the disparity because a much higher proportion of African-American
Assets are non-financial assets. An added base of comparison suggests
that the preceeding figure for African-Americans equals the 1880 average
for the white population. A glance at these statistics clearly outlines
the extent of capital deprivation confronting the African-American
population.
However, comparative statistics highlighting wealth distribution
disparities between the races fail to expose the complete class structure
of the accumulation process. For example, in 1962, 20% of the population
owned 75% of the wealth, and of this figure, 2% owned a little over 40%
of the wealth. Related figures for 1976 show that 16% of the population
owned 83% of the wealth, with the top 2% in control of 50%. Looking at
the same phenomenon from a different angle, in 1962, 80% of the population
had to share 25% of the total wealth, whereas in 1976, 84% of the popu-
lation was forced to share 17% of the total wealth. What becomes apparent
from these wealth distribution statistics is the fact that capital and
wealth in general are continually being concentrated into the hands of
those who are already in control of the vast majority of wealth in this
country.
Without question, these statistics point to a fundamental contra-
diction governing capitalism: "The rich get richer and the poor get
poorer." Entrance into the ranks of the "capitalist elite" for the
masses of working class people, and particularly for people of color,
has been systematically closed off. Of greater significance is the fact
that the pivotal institutions of this system, including the legal,
political, economic, and military institutions, are coordinated to rein-
force the dominance and control of the monopolist class over the accumu-
lation process.
It is for this reason that efforts to close the economic gap between
the African-American and white populations avoid the question of wealth
redistribution, and concentrate instead on the redistribution of access
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to employment opportunities. In an article by Firdhaus Jhabvala an
interesting hypothesis is presented. Jhabvala ventures to show that if
the current distribution of wealth remained constant, and if barring
racism, African-Americans were to receive a proportionate share of wages,
salaries, and profits, the per capita income of African-Americans would
still only approximate 78% of white per capita income. Thus under recially
utopian but economically capitalist conditions, the maximum that African-
Americans could earn would be less than 4/5ths of the average white income.
Without a redistribution of wealth, a different light is shed upon
affirmative action programs. Generally looked upon as development
programs capable of redressing past inequities, affirmative action programs
actually function as stabilization programs capable of at best, marginal
improvements. Unless anti-discriminatory policies and programs are carried
out in conjunction with a fundamental transformation of the class struc-
ture, current inequities will be consistently reproduced over time. This
fact is further evidenced by the following table.
RACIAL INEQUALITY OVER TIME: 1950-1974
1 2 3
Black Income/ Black Unempl/ Black Poverty/
White Income White Unempl White Poverty
Year (median)
1950 .54 1.8
1951 .53 1.7
1952 .57 1.9
1953 .56 1.7
1954 .56 2.0
1955 .55 2.2
1956 .53 2.3
1957 .54 2.1
1958 .51 2.1
1959 .54 2.2 2.9
1960 .55 2.1 3.1
1961 .53 2.1 3.2
1962 .53 2.2 3.4
1963 .53 2.2 3.3
1964 .56 2.1 3.3
1965 .55 2.0 3.5
1966 .60 2.2 3.5
1967 .62 2.2 3.4
1968 .63 2.1 3.4
1969 .63 2.1 3.3
1970 .64 2.0 3.2
1971 .63 1.8 3.1
1972 .62 2.0 3.5
1973 .60 2.1 3.5
1974 .62 2.0 3.3
From the table it would seem to follow that the task of primary
importance for social managers and policy-makers would be an analysis of
why and how the problem is consistently reproduced in progressively more
complex forms. However, dominant socio-economic theory, which regulates
the political and economic arenas, and consists of a range of perspectives
cluttering the spectrum between liberal and conservative poles, has yet
to critically engage the "why's and how's" of the African-American dilemma.
Even though the liberal and conservative perspectives within
dominant socio-economic theory give rise to competing political posi-
tions, they nonetheless share a common analytical base. Both in pre-
suming the sanctity of capitalism's "free market system" advocate that
the factors responsible for the continued existence of race and class
oppression are not the direct and inevitable consequence of the system
itself. With moderating variations, liberals and conservatives support
the standard neo-classical position that in the event of regulatory inter-
vention, the anti-discriminatory policies and measures should not com-
promise the principles and mechanisms of the market system, nor the class
structure upon which it is based.
There does exist a fundamental departure between the liberal solution
to the problem and the conservative solution. Liberal analysis identifies
"a cycle of poverty and entrapment" without, however, attacking its
source. Consequently, liberals believe that different forms of government
intervention directed at particular symptoms of race and economic discrimi-
nation can in the long run-eradicate the disparities between the African-
American and white populations. In other words modify the system. Con-
servatives contend quite simply that the system for the most part is
acceptable, it is the "disadvantaged victims" who need to be modified so
that they will be better equipped to play the game.
The liberal solution at best, attempts to stabilize worsening con-
ditions, while the conservative solution generally accepts the status
quo as the way things should be. Thus we witness the collective impact
of liberal and conservative policies as not only having been ineffective
in improving the relative socio-economic conditions confronted by the
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African-American population, but as having secured the marginal status
of African-Americans in this society. The point to be made is clear.
Solutions based upon an implicit acceptance of the structural biases
of the system are incapable of redressing the inequities that the system
reproduces, and ultimately aid in maintaining the process of reproduction.
In any social system, the prevailing ideological base of the intel-
lectual process and related policy directives will be derived from the
process which creates and preserves the fundamental distribution of power
upon which the system is founded. It is to be expected then, that dominant
socio-economic theory as a product of the system can only function to
rationalize and legitimize the system from which it is derived. For this
reason, the capitalist political and planning processes are incapable of
providing a legitimate base from which to fight the causes of racial and
economic oppression.
CHAPTER I
Technology and Capitalist Development
No matter how completely technics relies
upon the objective procedures of the
sciences, it does not form an independent
system, like the universe; it exists as
an element in human culture and it
promises well or ill as the social groups
that exploit it promise well or ill.
Lewis Mumford,
Technics and Civilization
Technology is not an autonomously determined element that neutrally
decides its own course of development in society. It is a product of the
class system in which it is applied. However, its overwhelming presence
and seemingly uncontrollable momentum has conditioned most to accept
its societal impacts as a preordained status quo. This influence exerted
over the social process prompted Marcuse to write, "It is no longer
capitalism which determines the state and nature of technology, but
technology that determines the state and nature of capitalism."2 Quoting
Marx in response to Marcuse's deterministic position, he states very
plainly:
It must be kept in mind that new forces of production do not
develop out of nothing nor drop from the sky. For it is neither
science nor technology that dominates the system of production,
but it is the domination of capital over labor which with every-
thing else turns technology into an instrument of exploitation and
class rule. 3
In a capitalist system development is fundamentally driven by the
capital accumulation process, or in other words, the reinvestment of
standard or increasing rates of profit in more profit yielding and capital
creating ventures. Within the sphere of production, neither the creation
of profit nor consequently the accumulation process, can exist in the
absence of labor. Stated in a different manner, "Whatever the extent of
automation and computerization, means of production neither operate nor
reproduce themselves."4 It is upon this base that the twin objectives
of technology as a function of capital become apparent.
First, technology as employed by the owners of capital, serves to
more efficiently extract increasing rates of profit during the process
of production. This can be accomplished in one of two ways. The incor-
poration of a technological innovation can increase the output for a given
number of workers; or, a labor-displacing technology can be introduced,
capable of maintaining a given level of production using a reduced number
of workers. In either situation, the objective of capital is to reduce
labor's share of the production costs. Labor-displacing technology can
be introduced, capable of maintaining a given level of production using
a reduced number of workers. Labor-displacing technology generates a
higher profit margin for capital not necessarily by increasing levels of
output, but by decreasing the total cost of labor for a given level of
output. It is this latter option that is setting the stage for the in-
tensified struggle over the control of technology between the owners and
managers of capital, versus members of organized labor.
Herein lies the second objective of technology as employed by capital.
Labor at any given moment can hold the accumulation process hostage.
Consequently, the growth and development of industrial technology has
been directed towards minimizing the dependence of capital on labor by:
1) undercutting labor's control over the production process through
automation; and 2) through technological applications, reducing the
number of workers required, and dividing the ranks of those remaining.
David Noble pointedly states:
Behind the technology that affects social relations lie those
very same social relations.... Technology of production is
therefore twice determined by social relations of production.
It is designed and deployed according to the ideology and
social power of those who make the decisions; and its actual
use in production is determined by the level of class antagonisms
on the shopfloor in the workplace. 5
It is worth noting that a number of social scientists have identified
the growing tendency for the forces of production to challenge the social
relations of production with increasing intensity. Much of this tendency
is rooted in capital's increased dependency on technological innovations
as a source of surplus profits, which ultimately speeds up the pace of
technological development in the production sphere. The profitability of
such innovations, as stated earlier, depends upon the relative strengths
that capital and labor bring into the workplace. The advancement of
Taylorism is a clear example of earlier attempts to understand and regulate
the antagonisms between man and machine at the point of production. The
objective was to more efficiently tap the profit maximizing potential of
a new technology by molding a new and transformed bond between the worker
and the new machine.
It is for this reason that Bill Lazonick in his article, "Techno-
logical Change and the Control of- Work," suggests the importance of
further analyzing technology outside of the production sphere and within
the context of the development of particular institutional structures.
Such an approach would be consistent with the increased emphasis upon
behavioral traits and attitudes, as opposed to the development of cognitive
skills. Quite expectedly, a key institution within the socialization
process designed to supply industry with a more adaptable worker is the
public education system. Lazonick concludes:
The institutional transformation of the larger society
was required to stabilize capital-labor relations in
the mass production industries. 6
Technology, simply defined, is another tool, then, when pressed
into the service of capital, functions to reinforce the fundamental dis-
tribution of power throughout class society. It should now be clear,
that in order to be fully understood, technology must be viewed as a
social process. The next task is to take a more theoretical look at
technology within the context of the capital accumulation process.
The accumulation process necessarily begins with labor, because
it is only from labor that the substance of profits, surplus value, can
be extracted. Surplus value is simply the wage paid to the worker sub-
tracted from the value of the commodity produced by the worker.
For example, if the commodity equivalent of a worker's wage is two
pairs of Jordache jeans, and the worker produces eight pairs through
the course of the work day, the amount of surplus value extracted from
the worker is worth six pairs of jeans (eight paims produced in total
minus two pairs for the worker's equivalent in wages equals six pairs of
jeans to the owner as surplus value). The owner of the capital (machines
and equipment), upon which the worker produces the jeans, gets the surplus
value for no other reason than the fact that capitalist society protects
the right of the owner (monopoly capital or individuals) to expropriate
the mass of surplus value created by the worker through his labor.
So ultimately, surplus value represents the mass of value created by
labor for which labor has not been compensated, and for which the capi-
talist has not had to pay.
The rate of surplus value, (S/v), sometimes referred to as the rate
of exploitation, represents the amount of surplus value measured against
the wage paid to the worker, which in our example is s/v = 6/2 or 3/1.
In other words, for every dollar the capitalist pays out in wages, he
will receive in return a sum of surplus value worth three dollars in
labor power for which he has not paid. For the worker, it means that for
every dollar of commodity value created by the worker during the process
of production, the worker will receive only 25 cents, while the owners of
capital receive the remaining 75 cents, (three parts out of every dollar
to the owners of capital, one part to the workers).
The preceding relationship warrants further clarification. Within
the context of the social relations of production, an individual capitalist
is not necessarily cheating the worker in a traditional sense of the word.
However, the system of capitalists, by controlling dynamics on both social
and economic fronts, tend to heighten the impact of the exploitative
relationship between individual capitalists and workers.
On the nature of wages in general, Marx writes:
By comparing the standard wages or values of labor in
different countries in different historical periods,
of the same country, you will find that the value of
labor itself is not fixed but of variable magnitude,
even supposing the value of all other commodities to
remain constant. 7
In a theoretical context, wages have generally been defined as the income
required for workers to sustain and reproduce their labor power. Clearly
in a more modern application, we can see that wages are in part the
function of a socially determined standard of living. This is the reason
why wages have historically been such a critical battleground between
management and organized labor. Unions tend to set standards that drive
up the socially determined portion of wages. This conflicts directly
with capital's interests. Without an increase in productivity (output
per worker), an increase in wages corresponds with a decrease in surplus
value and therefore profits that accrue to the capitalist. It is from
surplus value that profit is derived. If surplus value decreases, then
profit must go the way of surplus value.
It is important to understand that surplus value in commodity form
is useless to the capitalist until it is realized as profit through the
sale of the commodity produced. In our example, the surplus value of
six pairs of Jordache jeans has little meaning to the owner of capital
until the jeans are sold, releasing the potential profit captured by the
surplus value. It is only after surplus value has been realized in the
form of profit that the capitalization of surplus value can occur. The
capitalization of surplus value ultimately seals the capital accumulation
process, through investments in plant and equipment for the purposes of
expanding production capacity. In short, the accumulation process repre-
sents the capitalization of unpaid labor, and capitalism's survival
depends upon the continuity of this cycle of expanded reproduction.
The profit rate serves as the barometer owners of capital employ to
monitor the level of their participation within the capital accumulation
process. Mattick frames the issue nicely:
During an economic crisis, it is not the physical inability
to produce that depresses industrial output and capital ex-
pansion, but the inability to produce profitably. Therefore
it reasons to follow that in so much as capital functions
without regard to profitability, it does not function as
capital. 8
The profit rate represents the growth of surplus value against the total
costs of production for a specified period of time. It is derived from
a very straightforward equation: (S/c+v), where (s) represents the
amount of surplus value created by labor, (c) represents the total cost
of machinery and equipment used in production, and (v) represents the
total costs for labor in the form of wages and salaries.
The relentless quest for increasing rates of profit in an intensely
competitive environment leads to an increase in capital's share of total
production costs. Looking at the equation for the rate of profit, (s/c+v),
simple mathematics dictates that as labor's share of production costs
increases in the denominator, unless there is a proportionate increase
in the productivity of labor, or in other words, a proportionate increase
in the amount of surplus value created by labor, the rate of profit must
fall. At this juncture, the role of technology receives far more defini-
tion, and an explanation for the increasing dominance of capital over
labor during the production cycle develops.
In an economic environment shaped by declining opportunities for
capitalists to expropriate increasing rates of surplus value from ex-
panded markets, the drive is to decrease the amount of labor time required
to produce the commodity equivalent of the worker's wage. It follows then,
that an increase in output per worker (productivity), matched by de-
creasing labor costs, compensates as an alternative means by which
capital can effect a relative increase in the rate of surplus value, and
therefore realize greater profits.
The role of technology then, is to provide capital with a competitive
edge which allows the same or smaller amounts of labor to produce more
commodities than before. Mandel writes in Late Capitalism:
There thus develops a permanent pressure to accelerate
technological innovation. For the dwindling of other sources
of surplus-profits inevitably leads to a constant hunt for
"Technological Rents" which can only be obtained through
permanent technological renewal. Technological rents are
surplus profits derived from a monopolization of technical
progress which has the overall effect of lowering the cost
of production and price of the commodity. 9
The acceleration of technological innovations applied to the process of
production for the purposes of increasing productivity and holding down
wages is generally translated as an increase in capital's share of total
production costs. This shift towards an increase in the weight of capital
with respect to labor is identified as the rising organic composition of
capital, and is a tendency that is associated with the "advanced" stages
of industrial production processes.
The organic composition of capital can be stated as capital's share
of production costs and shown by (c/c+v), where c+v represents the com-
bined cost of capital and labor (v). As the organic composition of capital
rises its economic indicator is generally expressed as an increase in
productivity that outpaces increases in total production. The corollary
to this tendency is an increase in the use of labor-displacing technology
and a decrease in labor's share of total costs. Anne P. Carter, in
Structural Changes in the American Economy, 1939-61, concludes:
Most labor coefficients fell more than the corresponding
capital coefficients and thus the capital to labor ratio
increased in most sectors.... Of all the structural changes
reviewed thus far, the declines in direct labor coefficients
are most pronounced.... The economy behaves as if labor saving
(displacement of labor) were the goal of technical progress, and
most changes in intermediate and capital structure can be
justified by reduced direct and to a lesser extent indirect
labor requirements. 10
Some examples from specific industries tend to reinforce Carter's
study and further support the premise that the organic composition of
capital tends to rise. In steel production, changes in the processing
method lowered the share of labor costs in total costs of production from
25 percent to 17 percent, while the share of fixed capital costs rose from
16 percent to 25 percent.11 In oil refineries, between 1913 and 1955, the
number of labor hours needed for producing 10,000 tons of gasoline dropped
from 56 in 1913 to 0.4 in 1955.12 The replacement of universal production
machines by fully automated transfer machines in the French Renault auto
plants similarly altered the relation between labor costs and equipment
costs per vehicle from 4.8:1 to .26:1.13 In the cotton spinning industry
of the Federal Republic of Germany, the value of equipment per employee
rose by 1100 percent over a 20 year period from 1950 to 1970, in a model
plant incorporating the latest machinery. During this same period, the
number of employees working in three shifts declined from 274 to 62.14
The list is extensive. Given the nature of capital it is a safe assump-
tion to suggest that if labor-intensive technology was more profitable
than labor-displacing technology, the examples presented above would have
registered a counter tendency. The trend, however, clearly suggests the
opposite. Consequently the development of labor-displacing technology
can be expected to intensify.
Referring back to the rate of profit (s/c+v), and remembering that
labor is the only source from which surplus value can be created, it
stands to reason that as capital's share of production costs rises,
unless accompanied by a proportionate increase in surplus value, the
rate of profit will fall. The objective of labor displacing technology
is to counter its potentially depressing effect on the rate of surplus
value by increasing the productivity of labor. However, the prof it-
reducing effect of a declining number of workers cannot be perpetually
neutralized or compensated for by the technologically induced increase
of labor productivity. Herein lies the Achilles heel of the whole capital
accumulation and, therefore, capitalist development process. The follow-
ing quote is an appropriate summary of the issue:
This abstract dynamic does not affect capitalistic behavior.
Thus while the reduction of labor relative to capital be-
comes a detriment to capitalist production, the reduction
of labor costs remains a necessary requirement for each
single enterprise or corporation. Their profitability in-
creases as their labor costs decrease. It is for this
reason that the displacement of labor by capital cannot be
halted within the competitive capital formation process,
even though it undermines the structure of capitalist
society. 15
(What is good for the individual capitalist is bad for the class as a whole.)
When the capital accumulation process is placed within a social
framework that incorporates the impacts of monopoly capital, the generally
supportive role of government, and the class/social structure of society,
the "undermining of capitalist society" which was earlier referred to
in a broad sense is made manifest in its particular but nonetheless
related forms. A number of the social and economic conditions, and
related policy issues are deeply rooted in the distorted cycles of the
accumulation process. In fact the increased regulatory presence of govern-
ment can be viewed as an effort by the institutions in the political
arena to save capital from the increasing randomness of its self-destruc-
tive tendencies. Some of these tendencies along with their socio-economic
impacts for the African-American workforce will be identified and as-
sessed at greater length in subsequent chapters. Here it suffices to
state that the contradictions of capitalist society have a general impact
on all who are forced to depend on the system. However, the consequences
of these contradictions take on an added destructive intensity when social
and institutional doctrines such as racism are applied.
Earlier we observed that the driving force of andfor capital is
the expropriation of increasing rates of surplus value and profits
necessary to expand the accumulation process. Furthermore the measures
employed by capital to effect this condition tended towards labor dis-
placing-technology in an effort to cut costs. The resulting unemployment
may only be a temporary condition for certain individual workers, but
within the overall context of capitalism's accumulation process, the
crisis of unemployment is a permanent phenomenon. The permanence of
this phenomenon in capitalism is clearly reflected by the standards of
unemployment established by government to define the limits of social
welfare policy. For example, during the early sixties, the accepted rate
of unemployment for the active laborforce stood at a little over three
percent. The current rate stands closer to seven percent, with the ac-
cepted rate for the African-American workforce set at double the normal
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rate.
In a classical Marxist analysis, this permanent pool of unemployed
or surplus labor is referred to as the In-Reserve Army. Manipulation of
the size of the industrial reserve is commonly identified as one of
capital's wage regulating tactics. It is not dissimilar to a typical
neo-classical supply and demand analysis. When an acceleration in the
accumulation process triggers an increase in production, expanded pro-
duction capacity forces industry to hire workers from the surplus labor
pool thereby depleting the ranks of the industrial reserve. The dimin-
ishing supply of readily available labor, coupled with increased demand,
generates an upward pressure on wages. When employment reaches the point
where rising labor costs decrease capital's ability to expropriate
increasing amounts of surplus value, the accumulation process deceler-
ates. Workers are laid off, supply increases, demand decreases, and
wage inflation is stabilized. The Phillip's Curve which formerly served
as a tool for policymakers to monitor the tradeoff between inflation
(rising wages) and levels of unemployment identifies a similar pattern.
On the composition of the industrial reserve, Rosa Luxembourg
summed up the components and the effectiveness of trade union organizing
efforts within the Reserve, as follows:
The industrial reserve army of the unemployed, however,
puts what might be called a spatial restriction on the
effect of the trade unions: only the upper stratum of
better placed workers, for whom unemployment is only
periodical and, as Marx put it, "fluid," has access to
trade-union organization and its effects. The lower
strata of the proletariat consisting of unskilled
laborers, is significantly less suited to trade union
organization because of the spatial and temporal con-
ditions inherent in the nature of their employment.
The lowest strata is completely beyond the reach of
organization. The efficacy of trade unions within the
proletariat is thus only shallow on the vertical plane,
while it is, in contrast, broad on the horizontal
plane. 17
The social dynamics framing the composition of the industrial
reserve, the social policy of unions, and industrial growth are of key
importance in assessing the role of the African-American worker in early
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modern industry. The African-American workforce enetered the mainstream
labormarket as a marginally placed labor force. The accumulation
process disenfranchises a certain portion of the workforce in general.
Racism by design, however, has disproportionately concentrated the dis-
enfranchising effects of the accumulation process within the ranks of
the African-American workforce, reinforcing its marginality and thereby
the racial stratification of the society as a whole.
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CHAPTER II
An Agricultural History and the Impacts of Mechanization
The primary purpose of Chapter One was to set the theoretical
framework and to identify the major tendencies related to development
in a capitalist system. Within this context, technology was viewed as
a capitalist tool that reinforced, but was also determined by the social
relations of production particular to a given period of capitalist devel-
opment. At the end of Chapter One, a brief analysis of the Industrial
Reserve Army was undertaken to expose one of racism's consequences for
the African-American workforce. The effect of racism was observed
to disproportionately concentrate the labor-displacing tendencies of
capitalism within the ranks of the African-American workforce. This
last section of the chapter served only to provide an example of how
dual institutions within the system, racist ideology and the economic
structure, combine to repress the advancement of the African-American
workforce.
Chapter Two provides an historical analysis of the social and
economic dynamics that first restricted then discharged a large portion
of the African-American workforce from the southern plantation economy.
More specifically, the evolution of racism from a social ideology to
an organized set of social institutions will be analyzed in conjunction
with related technological trends in the economic structure of southern
agriculture. The intent is to provide a solid analytical base from
which to identify the social and economic constraints placed on
development for the African-American population.
An understanding of the development of American slavery must
fully recognize that the colonies did not exist in isolation from the
rest of the world. They were a part of an expanding and development
world economic system. Consequently, when the American colonies entered
the slave trade market, the precedent of importing African slave labor
had already been established by the Spanish, English and the French on
sugar plantations in Latin America and the Caribbean. It should also
be maintained that the racist ideology employed to justify the dehumani-
zation of the African man and woman in this country was the same
ideologically based doctrine used by the European colonizers to justify
the dispossession of Africa from Africans.
In analyzing this particular period of African-American labor
history, it is worth noting the fine distinction between slavery as a
labor system versus slavery as an institution of social oppression
maintained through the development of racist ideology. The following
presentation should show quite clearly that slavery and racism unquestion-
ably reinforced one another but were nonetheless semi-autonomous in their
responses to changing conditions.
There is a special reason for remaining conscious of the interdepen-
dence that characterizes changes in the economic structure and social
institutions. Such a perspective allows for a greater degree of ana-
lytical flexibility. It therefore avoids the trap of a deterministic
analysis that ascribes changes in the social structure to the economic
structure, which is considered the dominant base of society in that type
of analysis. By avoiding the determinist's trap, a better understanding
of the dual forces impacting the African-American worker in general
can be achieved.
In the United States, the regional distribution pattern of the
African-American population directly paralleled the mode of agricultural
production characterizing the region. This relationship is appropriately
illustrated in Table 1.1
TABLE 1
Proportion of African-Americans in the Colonies, 1715
Colony Total Pop. % African- Mode of Agricultural
American Production
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
**Pennsylvania-Del.
Maryland
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
9,650
96,000
9,000
47,500
31,000
22,500
45,500
50,200
95,000
11,200
16,750
1.6
2.1
5.6
3.2
12.9*
6.7
5.5
18.9
24.2
33.0
62.7
Small scale single
family farms
Mixed small scale farms
and plantations
Rice plantation economy
*New York was the site of a plantations experiment that failed, thereby
explaining its higher than average proportion for a northeastern colony.
**Under one governor in 1715.
The progression observed is quite clear. The colonies characterized by
large scale units of production or plantation agriculture had a greater
dependence upon slave labor, and consequently had a higher proportion of
African-Americans within their population.
In 1750 there were about 236,000 slaves in the American colonies,
which equalled four times the existing slave population in 1715.2 In
the 1760's a new variety of cotton was introduced to the Georgian
agricultural frontier that was only moderately received. Consequently,
by 1792, the United States had a total output of only 6000 bales of
cotton.3 However, towards the end of the 1700's, there existed several
key technological innovations that would significantly impact southern
agriculture, and consequently the development of slavery and African-
American people in the United States.
These inventions and innovations (the application of an invention),
marking the close of the 18th century, listed in their order of development,
included:5
1. The development and refinement of the spinning mule from
1768-1784.
2. Development of the steam engine in 1769.
3. Application of the steam engine to the English textile
industry in 1785.
4. The invention of the cotton gin in 1793.
With the application of the steam engine to the textile industry,
Britain developed a tremendous demand for the cotton grown in its
former colonies. Coupled with Eli Whitney's solution to the problem of
cotton seed removal (the cotton gin), the stage was set for sizable
profits in cotton production.
The consequence, of course, was a phenomenal increase in the growth
rate of cotton production and the growth of the slave population. The
results are presented below.
TABLE 2
Technological Innovations, Growth in Cotton Production,
and Growth in Slave Population, 1790-18606
Year Innovation Cotton % Slave %
Production/ Population
bales
1768 Spinning mule
1769 Steam engine (SE)
1785 Application of
SE to industry
1790 697,624
1792 6,000
1793 Cotton gin
1795 17,000 183.3
1800 73,000 329.4 983,602 28.1
1805 146,000 100.0
1810 178,000 21.9 1,191,362 33.3
1815 209,000 17.4
1820 1,538,022 29.1
1830 2,009,043 30.6
1840 1,348,000 2,487,355 23.8
1850 184.9 3,204,313 28.8
1860 3,841,000 3,953,760 23.4
Jordan
Foster
Frazier
1968: 317
1954
1949:39
The results speak for themselves. As the profitability of cotton increased,
more land was brought under cultivation for cotton production, thereby
increasing the demand for slave labor. With a cotton-based plantation
economy capable of absorbing large amounts of labor, the historical root
of the African-American worker in southern agriculture and America in
general is easily identified.
The dynamics in the previous section focused primarily on the
economic imperatives that guided the course of slavery as a labor system
for the southern plantation economy. These economic developments were
not occurring in isolation from the general trends that were shaping
southern society. It is important, therefore, to understand the plantation
economy, not as a string of individual units, but as a viable institution
capable of adapting to changing conditions. It is also equally important
to understand the ideological development of racism and its concretization
as an oppressive social process. These two issues are necessarily related
to one another.
In "The Decadence of the Plantation System," Ulrich B. Phillips
writes:
The plantation system indeed was less dependent upon slavery
than slavery was upon it; and the plantation regime has persisted
on a considerable scale to the present day in spite of the
destruction of slavery a half century since. The plantation
system formed, so to speak, the industrial social frame of
government in black belt communities, while slavery was a code
of written laws enacted for the furtherance of that system's
purposes. 7
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At the close of the Civil War and marking the beginning of the
Reconstruction Period (1877), the most important change affecting southern
agriculture was the abolition of slavery. Even though slavery had been
abolished, the fundamental labor needs of the plantation system remained
virutally unchanged. Through a set of economic and social arrangements,.a
labor force was coordinated for the big plantation owner. Jay R. Mandle
suggests in his book, the Roots of Black Poverty, that:
A plantation economy is defined as one in which the state
of technology allows profit-maximizing large-scale farmers
to produce a staple primarily for an external market. That
same technology, however, requires the use of more workers
than profitably low wage rates would attract. As a result,
some non-market mechanism is required in order for the
planters to be sure of a sufficient supply of workers to
carry out profitable production. In turn, those non-market
mechanisms help to define the class relations of the society.
The culture which reemerges reinforces these class relations. 8
The model suggested by Mandle closely approximates social conditions
particular to the post-Civil War south.
The Reconstruction Period from 1866 to 1877 is generally identified
as one of the most politically progressive eras for African-Americans in
the United States. As part of the Congressional Reconstruction mandate
for readmission, all southern states that had seceeded from the Union
were required to ratify the 14th Amendment and grant universal suffrage
to all of its natural born citizens. Consequently, at the outset of
Reconstruction, the south had 700,000 African-American and 660,000 whites
registered to vote. Table 3 demonstrates the potential political power
base that never materialized for a number of reasons.
TABLE 3
African-American Representation in
Reconstruction Constitutional Conventions9
State African-Americans African-Americans
in Population (%) in Convention (%)
So. Carolina 60 61
Louisiana 50 50
Florida 47 40
Virginia 41 24
Georgia 44 19
Mississippi 55 17
Alabama 45 17
Arkansas 27 12
No. Carolina 37 11
Texas 25 10
Even where African-Americans were a majority of the population,
Reconstruction legislatures were never controlled by African-Americans.
For all the potentially progressive legislation churned out during this
period it was significantly deficient in a very critical area. This
deficiency is framed by the failure of the legislation to provide for a
comprehensive land redistribution program. The consequences of this
failure regarding African-American self-reliant development are evi-
denced by the socio-economic conditions confronting the African-American
population today.
As it had been stated earlier, the destruction of the slave labor
system initially left plantation owners without the legal means to press
their former slaves into servitude. So, even though planters were once
again in control of their land resources, they were without the labor
resources necessary to turn a profit from the land. It is at this juncture
that we witness the accelerated institutional development of racist
ideology.
Many of the southern states solved the labor problem created in the
absence of the slave labor system by passing laws that were designed to
serve the social control functions previously served by slavery. These
so called "Black Codes" had the effect of limiting the social, economic,
and geographic mobility of the African-American population. As a result,
most African-Americans were forced to submit to a free market form of
slavery known as tenant sharecropping. It should be noted that between
1890 and 1910, manufacturing employment increased in the United States by
a total of 5.6 million jobs. Of these additional jobs, only 6.8 percent
were located in the six states where plantation agriculture was most
important--Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South
Carolina. From these figures it is apparent that the industrial
sector offered very few opportunities for a substantial portion of the
African-American workforce to escape the confines of southern plantation
agriculture. Even if southern industrial expansion had opened new avenues
for employment, these options would have been closed off to the majority
of African-American workers, primarily for the purposes of maintaining a
substantive labor supply for the plantation economy.
The exact origins of the share tenancy arrangement are not clear.
However, it suffices to say that the motivating force was the necessity
to control labor at a time when land was plentiful and labor was needed
to work the land. Ultimately, the same basic forces that conditioned the
development of slavery were found to be operative in the spread of
sharecropping arrangement. This is evidenced by the fact that between
1866 and 1885, cotton production increased from 1,948,000 bales to
6,369,000 bales; and land under cultivation increased from 7,766,000
acres to 17,922,000 acres. Once again the economic issue is framed
by the social issue of labor control. In slavery, the mechanisms of
control involved force and legal status. Under the share-tenancy arrange-
ment, force was still a factor, but the institutionalization of racist
restrictions backed by force was the combination that maintained a steady
supply of freed African-American labor to the plantation economy.
A conventional sharecroppers arrangement basically meant that the
landlord would provide most of the supplies and the tenant family would
supply the labor. The tenants were not paid until after the harvest.
At that time, the landlord would weigh the harvest, determine its value,
deduct his share, deduct the amount of the tenant's indebtedness incurred
during the course of the growing season, and assign the balance to the
tenant, if in fact there was anything left to assign.12 Since the land-
lord controlled the books, the tenants were completely vulnerable to
the manipulative tactics used by the landlords to squeeze out extra
profits from the transactions. Due to the control factor, share tenancy
arrangements were preferred by the landlords over the hiring of wage
labor. This preference is borne out by the fact that in 1880, 36.2
percent of all southern farms were tenant operated. This proportion in-
creased to 55.6 percent by 1930.13
Throughout the growth of the share-tenancy arrangement in the south,
there was also a concurrent rise in the proportion of whites involved
in cotton production. It is estimated that the proportion of the cotton
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crop produced by whites increased from a negligible amount before the
Civil War to almost 40 percent in 1876, and close to 65 percent in
1910. 1 Table 4 identifies the racial composition of the southern
agricultural sector for 1910.
TABLE 4
Farm Tenure by Race in the South, 191015
Tenure African-American White
Owners 218,467 1,326,044
full 59% 68%
part 41% 32%
Tenants 670,474 866,278
Even though Table 4 does not include wage laborers, the relative
statistics for ownership adeuqately define the inequitable conditions in
agriculture dominated by a socially based plantation economy. Of the
total African-American farm operators, less than 25 percent were full or
part owners, whereas the corresponding statistics for the white population
approximated 60%. In relationship to the total African-American population,
owners within the group represented only 2.6 percent of the total. The
related statistic for the white population was close to 13 percent.
Even in light of the inequities, of key importance to this period
was the increased interracial character of the tenant sharecropper system.
The racial mix of this group created the base for the development of
one of the few mass political movements in the south. Ironically, the
aftermath of the movement resulted in the development of a politically
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endorsed, segregated society. The movement in question here was the
Populist Movement. The movement itself was a response to the distortions
created in agriculture caused by the development of industrial capitalism.
These distortions were characterized by high interest rates, high
railroad rates, large mortgage debts, and increased pressure on southern
landowners to ride the backs of their tenant sharecroppers.
The result was the development of the Granger movement coming out
of the midwest and focusing on skyrocketing railroad rates. It began in
1867 and provided the foundation for the growth of the Greenback movement
in 1875, whose platform was basically built around the accessibility of
cheap money to ease the strain of agricultural debts.16 The organization
that cornered the support of the southerners was the Southern Farmers
Alliance, which excluded African-American farmers. As a compromising
measure, the leadership of.the Southern Alliance recognized the need for
a coalition base, and consequently helped to found the Colored National
Farmers Alliance in 1886.17
The joint alliances cooperated in a farmer program to regulate
railroad rates, create cheap money, establish cooperative, reduce taxes,
nationalize transportation, and protect African-American political rights.
As late as 1910, at least 90 percent of the total African-American popula-
tion in the United States was located in the south. With close to 60
percent working in agriculture, even in light of racist attitudes, the
southern Farmers Alliance was forced to court the political support of
the Colored National Farmers Alliance.
In 1892, the various groups came together as the People's Party,
in February of that year. For the record, the party pulled over
one million votes and carried four states in the presidential election.
In addition, Populist governors were elected in four states, and the
People's Party placed 345 representatives in 19 states during the 1893
elections. As a political concession for African-American support,
Populist platforms consistently demanded a secret ballot and an end to
lynching. The political successes of the various alliances in the south
directly threatened the economic and political domination of the planta-
tion interests, who were politically represented by the Democratic party
in the south.
Identifying race as the weak link in the Populist coalition, the
Democrats methodically set out to exploit the weakness. A campaign was
launched among the poor whites, consequently raising strong anti-African-
American sentiments based upon the experiences of Reconstruction. Other
tactics involved blatant cases of vote-tampering and election stealing.
The People's Party resolved that if it was to remain politically viable,
its alliance with the African-American agenda was going to have to be
terminated.18 After sacrificing the African-American agenda, the end
result of the agrarian revolt was a white race unified in opposition to
African Americans.
A vehemently racist campaign was launched by the elitist plantation
interests with the goal of disenfranchising African-Americans. From
previous data we have seen that in those areas dominated by a plantation
economy, there existed a high concentration of African-Americans within
that given population. By manipulating the phobia of "African-American
domination" on the part of poor whites, the Democratic Party (the planta-
tion elite), was able to psyche the majority of the white voters into
supporting a party representing the interest of the planters rather than
their own interest.
By 1910, Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana, North Carolina,
Alabama, Virginia, Georgia, and Oklahoma had all enacted legislation
restricting or eliminating African-Americans from the voter rolls. The
political excess was reinforced by violence. For example, in the core
states of the south, between 1882 and 1903, there were 1217 lynchings
committed against African-Americans, and a wave of Jim Crow legislation was
enacted throughout the south. Prior to 1900, there was only one segrega-
tionist law on the books in the south, and that pertaining to separation
on trains. 9 The beginning of the twentieth century brought forth a wave
of Jim Crow legislation that stressed segregation through all tiers of
the social and economic processes in the south.
As a result, the cultural/social hegemony of racism had become a
deeply institutionalized condition controlling relationships in the
economic sphere, and consequently undercutting the base of development
for the African-American population. Williams paraphrases Gramsci's
formulation of cultural or ideological hegemony as follows:
An order in which a certain way of life and thought is
dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused
throughout society in all its institutional and private
manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste,
morality, customs, religious, and political principles,
and all social relations particularly in their intel-
lectual and moral connotations. 20
The economic indicators for the African-American workforce show that in
the south 62 percent of the African-American workforce was engaged in
agriculture, with another 18 percent employed in domestic and personal
services. For the African-American population in general, it meant that
75 percent of its workforce entered the twentieth century with virtually
no access to the industrial labor process.21
Before continuing it is appropriate at this point to review briefly
what has been presented. In the slave labor system we witness the
ultimate form of capitalist economic exploitation. Drawing from Chapter
One, we remember a couple of important relationships. Firstly, surplus
value is the difference between total output and that portion which is paid
to labor. Secondly, the wage paid to a worker is the combination of an
economic component required by the worker to purchase basic necessities,
and a social component of additional value that is determined by the
standard of living for a given society. Under slavery, the owner paid
no wages. He provided only that which was minimally required for the
slave to reproduce his/her labor power. Consequently, the only restriction
placed upon the potential expropriation of surplus value from the slaves,
during the course of the work day, was the physical limit of exhaustion that
would prevent the slave from performing the desired tasks the following day.
In order for slavery to be profitable, a mode of production was
required that could efficiently absorb the quantity of labor being
exploited. The plantation economy in southern agriculture provided the
base for a scale of production capable of turning a profit from a labor
intensive process of that magnitude. It is important to remember that
the plantation economy was highly dependent upon the development of
institutions capable of controlling and maintaining a steady supply of
labor for production purposes.
Up until the Civil War, the institution of slavery backed by
racist ideology, served as the social control mechanism. After the
Civil War, with the abolition of slavery and the dominance of the plan-
tation elites threatened, racist ideology was institutionalized in the
form of Jim Crow legislation and restrictions on the economic mobility
of the African-American population in the south. The end result was a
return to a modified version of slavery in the form of sharecropping.
The desired outcome was achieved: a steady supply of plantation labor
that was effectively controlled through the political structure and
vigilante violence.
The mutually supportive relationship between racist ideology and
the mode of production had transformed the plantation economy into a
system of social and economic oppression, underwritten by the sanctioned
use of violence by whites to control the African-American population.
Furthermore, in responding to the labor needs of the plantation economy,
racist ideology accelerated into a dynamic of its own, resulting in the
social institution of segregation.
Following the two World Wars, developing conditions began weakening
the underpinnings of the plantation system as a social and economic in-
stitution. The task of the next section is to take a look at some of
those factors, and to scope the increased movement of the African-American
population into non-agricultural employment.
In the previous section, a critical factor cited as a partial ex-
planation for the massive concentration of African-American workers
in agriculture was the lack of and exclusion from alternative employment
options. Up until the First World War, the expanding labor requirements
of northern industrial capitalism were filled by European immigrants.
Between 1850 and 1920, foreign immigration averaged 500,000 per year,
subject to fluctuations in the European and American economic cycles.
However, a brief look at immigration figures from 1910 to 1919 highlight
the void created by World War I.22
TABLE 5
European Migration 1910-1919
1910 1,041,570
1911 878,587
1912 838,172
1913 1,197,892
1914 1,218,480
1915 326,700
1916 298,826
1917 295,403
1918 110,618
1919 141,132
The labor shortage, along with the needs of the war economy were
the primary components of the economic pull factors triggering the first
wave of African-American migrations to the industrial cities of the
midwest and northeast.
During the war period, the corresponding figures for African-
American migration from the south totaled an estimated 425,000 persons.
With the passing of a new immigration law in 1921, after a brief rise,
European immigration rates never regained pre-war levels. Consequently
between 1920 and 1930, African-American outmigration from the south
increased by 65 percent, to slightly over 700,000 persons.23 Had it
not been for the Depression Era, rates of outmigration would have con-
tinued at increasing rates, thereby accelerating the crisis that eventually
confronted the plantation economy after the second World War.
In analyzing the pivotal factors involved in the geo-spatial
transition of African-Americans, from the south to the north, a clear
distinction can be made between the pre-World War II period and the
post-World War II period. As the figures just presented suggest, prior
to World War II, the pull of potentially economic conditions influenced
the migratory rationale of'the majority of African-Americans. However,
after World War II, the combination of a push factor from agriculture
and the pull of post-war expansion, resulted in the fundamental breakdown
of the plantation economy., The expected outcome of course, was the
release of African-Americans from agricultural employment in large numbers,
and a steady flow of migrants out of the south. Graph I summarizes
comparative migration figures for African-American and European migrants.
Table 6 presents supportive data identifying regional and urban shifts.
Graph I- Rate of Immigration to United States and Bilack Out-.
Migration From Six Plantation States: (Alabama, Geor-
gia, Louisana, Mississippi, N. Carolina, S. Carolina)
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TABLE 6
Percentage Distribution of African-American Population
by Region and Urban Areas, 1910-196025
Regional Urban
Year U.S. South Non-South U.S. South Non-South
1910 89.0 11.0 27.4 21.2 77.5
1920 85.1 15.9 34.0 25.3 84.5
1930 78.8 21.2 43.7 31.7 88.1
1940 77.1 22.9 48.6 36.5 89.1
1950 68.0 32.0 62.4 47.6 95.2
1960 60.0 40.0 73.2 58.4 95.2
An analysis of the breakdown of the plantation economy reveals that
a combination of market/non-market, system-wide and regional dynamics
were involved. The outcome was a rapid mechanization of agriculture in
the south that had a disproportionate impact on African-Americans due
to their concentrated status as laborers and tenants.
It is important to recognize that the basic tendencies of capitalist
development that apply to industry are also applicable to agriculture.
Just as increased productivity in industry allows for a smaller workforce
to produce the goods demanded by the population, over time, increased
mechanization of agriculture allows for a drastically reduced percentage
of the farm population to engage in agricultural production and yet still
adequately supply the needs of the nation. The tendency towards concen-
tration that is characterized by monopolist domination in the industrial
sector is expressed as a progressive increase in the amount of acreage
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cultivated on a decreasing number of farms. The following figures
support this contention. Between 1940 and 1969, although the amount of
land in farms remained relatively constant at 1,065,000 acres, the total
number of farms decreased from 6,102,000 to 2,730,000. In the south
during the same period, the number of farms declined from 3,007,000 to
1,161,000.26 The tendencies identified above were for the most dormant
in southern agriculture until after the second World War.
The plantation economy was insulated against the technological
trends sweeping agriculture, primarily due to the institutional arrange-
ments that provided for a steady supply of African-American labor power.
The low wages that could be maintained through a labor-intensive mode of
production effectively blocked any major shifts towards capital-intensive
production in southern agriculture. This condition is clearly highlighted
by national statistics rating the relative levels of tractor power in
use. Of the 920,000 tractors on farms in 1930, only 16 percent were in
the south. In addition, well under 20 percent of farm operations were
performed by tractor power in the south compared to a national average of
over 50 percent for the same operations. Even as late as 1939, the figure
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for the south was just approaching 25 percent.
As we noted in the previous section, consistent with the growth of
the plantation economy, was a decline in the number of owner operated
farms, and an increase in the rate of tenant farming by both African-
Americans and whites. However, on the eve of World War II, tenant farming
still carried with it a racially determined status. Sixty percent of all
African-American tenants were sharecroppers as opposed to 25 percent of
white tenants. Fifty-two percent of the white farm operators were full
owners, whereas the corresponding statistic for African-American farm
operators was 18 percent. When compared against total ownership, African-
American holdings only represented 11 percent of the total. From a
security standpoint based upon ownership, the figures indicate that African-
Americans involved in the agricultural sector were almost twice as vul-
nerable to changing conditions. It is important to add that these numbers
do not include full and part-time laborers. Naturally an inclusion of
these workers radically intensifies the impacts that any labor altering
change in agriculture would have on the African-American population in
general.
Advances in production methods generally occur when a firm or opera-
tion is faced with a production problem that requires a technological
breakthrough. The production problem encountered by southern agriculture
was basically the result of a dwindling supply of labor. This was further
complicated by the fact the cost of manufactured goods were rising in com-
parison to the price paid for agricultural produce. Very simply, this
means that over time farmers lose purchasing power. The problem for the
plantation economy was defined then as the need to produce more with a
shrinking supply of labor. The system was thus trapped in a production
fix that would eventually be answered through mechanization.
From Graph I, we noticed that the forebodings of a potential labor
crisis were briefly glimpsed between 1910 and 1930 when 1.1 million
African-Americans migrated from the south. However, the Depression and
reduced employment opportunities in the north abruptly halted the trend.
This was not to be the case from 1940 on. The war required an available
pool of labor capable of immediately filling the voids in northern in-
dustry. Between voluntary migration and the labor recruiters from
northern-based war industries, African-American out-migration between
1940-50 surpassed the previous twenty year total at slightly over 1.1
million persons. This movement is reflected through statistics showing
a decrease in the percentage of the African-American work force in agri-
culture, from 41 percent to 28 percent, between 1940 and 1944.28
The response of southern agriculture is predictable. Between 1940
and 1945, tractors on farms increased by 136 percent, and accelerated to
29
a 250 percent increase between 1945 and 1948. Following innovations in
International Harvester's model picker, harvesting of the cotton crop,
which had remained labor-intensive, also became increasingly mechanized.
Prior to its actual impacts, it was predicted that the complete mechaniza-
tion of all operations would reduce labor requirements by a total of 82
percent per each acre of cotton cultivated or likewise a reduction from
30
160 man hours per bale to 28 man hours per bale. The House of Represen-
tatives Committee on Industrialization in the South, in 1947 projected a
displacement figure of 1.2 million to be expected by 1965. By 1969, the
awtual job loss was 2.3 million.3 1
The traditional mode of southern plantation agriculture had finally
become subject to the basic tendencies of capitalist development. By
1964, the average acreage for a commercial farm in the south had increased
from 123 acres in 1940 to 252 acres. Given the fact that between 1950
and 1964 the number of farms decreased by 2,228,000, while land acreage
remained fairly constant, the increase in farm size could have only come
about through the consolidation of land forfeited by bankrupt small
farmers.32 The process is not unlike monopolist development in the in-
dustrial sector. Increasing scales of operation require greater amounts
of capital in order to produce profitably, consequently squeezing out the
smaller operators who can no longer compete effectively. Table 7 illus-
trates this trend in agriculture.
TABLE 7
Change in Number of Farms in Terms of Value
of Gross Sales, 1950-6433
Farm Class Change
$2500-4999 -439,000
5000-9999 -217,000
10,000- 383,000
Data presented in Table 7 are based upon farm classes 1 through 5
($2500 of sales and up). Class 6, which is the poorest strata of farmers,
represented 37 percent of American fanns, and accounted for 65% of all
farms operated by African-Americans. The result is what seems to be an
irreversible resource crisis for the African-American population. In
1910, aggregate ownership of land for African-Americans approached 16
million acres. The current figure stands closer to 3.5 million.
The uncontrolled transition of southern agriculture did not evolve
in a vacuum. The social and economic sacrifice forced upon the African-
American population was high. African-Americans absorbed the brunt of
over 10 generations where more than half of the workforce was restricted
to the agricultural sector, yet in the span of two decades were expected
to take full advantage of already exhausted or diminishing opportunities
in the urban arena. The immediate consequences were seen in the urban
explosions that ripped through the mid-sixties. Having left the south
with expectations of better conditions, on a different level, many en-
countered conditions that paralleled those that they had left.
The industrial and urban transition of the African-Americampopulation
has always been an ongoing process. The task of the next chaptemsis to
present and analyze the obstacles responsible for distorting the transi-
tion, and to assess federal efforts to compensate for the inherent in-
equities of capitalist social and economic institutions.
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CHAPTER III
The Transition Towards Industry and the
Effects of Racism and Technological Change
During slavery, it was a standard practice for slave owners to
hire out their slaves to area craftsmen and manufacturers for a fee.
A precedent was set through this practice that would critically impact
the advancement of African-Americans in non-agricultural pursuits.
First of all, the renting and ownership of slaves tended to be a
very profitable arrangement for both manufacturers and slaveowners. The
manufacturer could generally rent the slave's services for a fee that was
far below the market rate for standard wage labor. The result of course
was the increased displacement of white workers by slave labor and a
general lowering of wages. The reactions of the white workers for the
most part were never directed against the owners of capital who were
responsible for controlling the process. The white workers' reactions
were typically manifested by an escalated antaonism directed against
African-Americans.
The second consequence of the hiring or owning of slaves by manufac-
turers was the standardization of job segregation. Slaves were generally
employed to do the jobs that were considered too dangerous or dirty by
the white workers. A corollary to segregation by tasks was the segrega-
tion by occupation. By 1850, approximately 5 percent of all slaves were
industrially employed.2
In the crafts a similar situation existed. Even though the planta-
tion as a collective functioned as a coordinated system, each plantation
individually was a self-reliant unit. Those slaves not working the fields
were used as maintenance crews. As a result, a relatively high number of
slaves on the plantation and in the towns had developed highly tuned
craft skills. Area craftsmen who needed extra helpers or apprentices
quite often resorted to the use of African-American slaves. Economically,
the choice of slave labor was less expensive. The result of the practice
is witnessed by the statistic showing that in 1865, 5 out of every 6
artisans (100,000 out of 120,000) were African-Americans.3 The consequence
for the white artisan was no different than the condition confronting the
white industrial worker. This process of economically based racial compe-
tition was one of the platforms racist ideologues used to sharpen an-
tagonisms between the races. Remembering the Reconstruction experience
of the south taking place shortly after 1865, it should be specifically
noted that the ideologues in question here are the plantation elites and
the industrial capitalists, who, in the quest for profits, had forced the
competition in the first place. When the preference for African-American
labor no longer proved to be profitable, the context for the African-
American worker in industry and the crafts was radically altered. In fact,
once the African-American craftsman lost the "protection" of the capitalist
interests, the reaction of lower class whites was carried out with a
swift vengeance. Whereas in 1865 83 percent of the artisans were African-
American, by 1900 only one out of 20, or five percent were.4
The racist reaction in the south was matched by that in the north.
Discriminatory employment practices and levels of violence were just as
prominent. The competition between European immigrants and African-
Americans from the south created an explosive situation. The immigrants
were employed in large numbers at the exclusion of African-Americans prior
to World War I. There exists no particular reason to assume that European
immigrants, also displaced from agricultural backgrounds, had any
level of skills greater than that of African-Americans from the south.
Exclusion was racially motivated, and the entitlement of favorability
assumed by the immigrants, was forcefully defended. A competitive threat
from African-Americans was reacted to violently.
A growing labor movement and the war based expansion of industry
altered the situation. White employers who had formerly refused to hire
African-American workers began to reverse their positions. Labor recruiters
from the north were sent into the south, to bring back workers for industry.
Industrialists employed this tactic for two basic reasons. The shrinking
labor supply, a consequence of reduced immigration and the increased em-
ployment of surplus labor in war related production was driving up wages.
The importation of African-American workers tended to moderate wage in-
creases. The second objective behind the recruitment of African-American
laborers was related to their use as strikebreakers. As one employer put
it, "We took black labor out of the south until it hurt." 5
As a result, much of the racial violence in the United States during
World War I and the immediate post war years was closely related to job
competition. A major riot in East St. Louis, Illinois, in 1917, that claim-
ed the lives of 39 African-Americans, was in large part due to racial hos-
tilities that had been inflamed by the use of African-Americans as strike-
breakers.6 A Congressional committee report stated afterwards, "Respon-
sibility for this influx of 10,000 or more Negroes into East St. Louis
rests on the railroads and manufacturing establishments.... It is a
lamentable fact that the employers of labor paid too little heed to the
comfort or welfare of their men. They saw them crowded into wretched
cabins, without water or any of the conveniences of life."7
In this process we see a classic enactment of the uses and purpose
of the Industrial Reserve Army. As to the validity of the Industrial
Reserve, it is attested to by the fact that northern industrialists in
a calculated move, intentionally increased its ranks by importing African-
American labor. The result was greater control over the labor process.
Violence also appeared as part of a major post-war attempt to reverse
wartime African-American economic advances. At least 25 race riots took
place in 1919 alone. The worst of these was in Chicago and was due to
the use of African-American strikebreakers.8 The riot caused 15 white and
23 African-American deaths, with hundreds injured on both sides. It is
a safe bet that none of the corporate bosses responsible were victimized
by the violence. These occurences continued with reduced frequency and
lesser intensity for the next several years.
To focus attention on the African-American strikebreakers, inap-
propriately displaces the trade and labor union movement from the social
and political contexts in which they evolved. Prior to the war, it was not
uncommon for white workers to walk off the job in protest of having to
work with African-Americans. Many of the racial antagonisms that were
socially based were further sharpened in the workplace. Consequently,
discriminatory practices of the union movement constituted a major barrier
to African-American economic advancement. The class consciousness of the
rank and file white laborer only extended as far as the racial boundary.
Early American Federation of Labor leadership recognized the need to
organize the growing mass of African-American workers in order to reduce
their potential use as strikebreakers. The leadership of the AFL
advocated a non-discriminatory policy failed to forcefully back it up.
Time and time again it acceeded to the regional pressures of its member-
ship. Ultimately the rank and file union membership has been able to
counter the liberal tendencies advanced by the AFL leadership. By doing
so, however, they ultimately played into the hands of capitalist manipu-
lators. I would suggest here that the real issue behind African-American
strikebreaking was not the class unconsciousness of the African-American
worker, but the race consciousness of the white workers.
In spite of the obstacles limiting access to employment in manufac-
turing, migration after the war still continued, spurred on by the promise
of wartime gains. Between 1914 and 1919, the number of wage workers
engaged in manufacturing increased from 7 million to 9 million. From 1910
to 1920, the level of African-American employment in industry expanded 61
9
percent, (5551,825 to 901,181).
As wartime production contracted, the acceleration of African-
Americans into manufacturing also slowed. The depression years of the
thirties brought the momentum gained through the early twenties to a
grinding halt. Therefore, from an historical perspective, African-Americans
did not legitimately enter the mainstream of the labor process until 1940
or the beginnings of World War II. Table 8 is a reflection of African-
American blue collar employment in 1920 and 1940.
TABLE 8
Blue Collar Employment in Manufacturing by Race,
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1920 to 1940
1920 1940
white black white black
Blue Collar
total employed -- 825,321 14,983,150 1,254,000
percent 100 100 100 100
skilled 32.4 16.6 32.4 14.2
semi-skilled 19.1 15.5 51.4 35.8
unskilled 48.5 67.9 16.2 50.0
A closer look at Table 8 reveals some interesting relationships.
In 1920 an African-American blue collar worker stood a 40 percent greater
chance of being concentrated in an unskilled laborer's position than a
white blue collar worker. On the other hand, however, African-American
"blues" were almost twice as likely not to be employed as skilled crafts-
man or machinist, relative to their white counterparts. By 1940, an
African-American blue collar worker was three times more likely to be
employed as a laborer than a white worker, and 1.5 times less likely to
be employed as a semi-skilled operative. The comparative figures for skilled
positions remained relatively the same. However, the 2.4 percent drop
witnessed on the part of the skills category for African-American workers
can probably be explained by racial exclusion from the trade unions.
A major shift within the blue collar category was seen in the rapid
growth of the semi-skilled operative position. According to the
Statistical History of the United States, using 1947 as the base year,
the index of output per man-hour for production workers, rose by 108
percent, from 44.6 to 93.2, between 1920 and 1940.1 The shift towards
semi-skilled/operatives within the blue collar category, along with pro-
ductivity increases, would seem to suggest a concurrent growth in the
application of technology to the production process. In other words,
the increased automation of the production processes in industry.
These comparative statistics are clearly reflective of the African-
American worker's late start in manufacturing. The position of the worker
once he was able to get past discriminatory hiring policies, was further
conditioned by racism in the unions and on the shop floor, and seniority
rights. The combination of these factors culminated in the saying,
"Last hired, first fired." In reviewing the statistics for African-
American blue collar workers, it should be maintained that the statistics
only identify the internal dynamics of a particular occupational category,
during 1940. As an isolated category, blue collar workers provide a clear
perspective on the precedents that were set as African-Americans began
breaking with their agricultural and domestic service positions. It is
still important to note, however, that in 1940, slightly over a quarter
of the African-American workforce was blue collar. The majority of the
workforce, 66 percent, was evenly divided between agriculture and
services.12  Even though World War II is associated with the major push
of African-Americans into industry, the relative deprivation of its
beginnings were blatantly apparent as late as the mid-sixties. Some
brief illustrations of African-American occupational distribution for
a few of the major industries in the sixties bear an undeniable
resemblance to the 1940 picture. The tables are presented below.
TABLE 9
Big Three Automobile Companies:
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Employment by Race, 1966
All Employees
Occupational Group Total Black % Black
Officials and Managers 74,395 - 903 1.2
Professionals 51,053 301 .6
Technicians 24,499 297 1.2
Sales, Office and Clerical 93,365 3,545 3.8
Total White Collar 243,312 5,046 2.1
Craftsmen 129,123 3,846 3.0
Operatives 515,843 104,112 20.2
Laborers 32,352 8,922 27.6
Service 26,755 7,269 27.2
Total Blue Collar 704,073 124,149 17.6
Total 947,385 129,195 13.6
The table does not require too much of an explanation. African-
American representation is clearly deficient in the white collar ranks,
but disproportionately high in the blue collar ranks. Also worth noting
is the fact that the prestige blue collar position of craftsman has a
composition of three percent African-American, even though African-
Americans represent over 17 percent of the blue collar workforce. Of
the 124,149 employed African-American blue collar workers, 83 percent
were operatives. Likewise, for the 5,046 African-Americans employed as
white collar workers, 70 percent were employed in office and/or clerical
positions. Only 1.1 percent of the African-Americans employed were placed
in the top three categories. The analysis is summarized with the fact
that 96 percent of the African-Americans employed in the auto industry
were concentrated in the lower wage, non-vertically integrated positions.
And remember, these statistics are taken from 1966.
The situation was much the same in the steel industry as attested
to by Table 10.
TABLE 10
Basic Steel Industry, Percentage Distribution of
African-Americans in Blue Collar Occupations, 1963-6814
Occupational Group 1963 1964 1966 1968
Craftsmen (skilled) 10.4 10.8 11.0 11.6
Operatives (semi-skilled) 51.9 52.2 51.4 51.8
Laborers (unskilled) 33.8 32.8 32.4 30.4
Service workers 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.9
(White collar) (1.3) (1.7) (2.5) (3.3)
Total blue collar 98.7 98.3 97.5 96.7
Total employment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Over a five year period occupational distribution changed very little.
From the figures it is evident that no less than 85 percent of the
African-American blue collar workforce was concentrated in the lower
wage positions, moving into the decade of the seventies. The corres-
ponding figure for white blue collar workers was no more than 55 percent.
As an added dimension, during this period blue collar position declined
by 1.3 percent with 70 percent of the decline attributable to the dis-
employment of laborers. A further statistic reveals that in 1968, of all
the African-American workers employed in the steel industry, 96.7 were
blue collar employees. Of the remaining 2.3 percent in white collar po-
sitions, 64 percent were clerical or office employees.
A final example is taken from the aerospace industry. In this
example we witness the technological impacts of a changing product mix
on labor requirements. For' instance, between 1950 and 1963, the Douglas
Aircraft Company increased its portfolio of government/military contracts.
The varying labor requirements for different products is shown by the
following table.
TABLE 11
Changing Labor Needs for the Douglas Aircraft Co.15
Product Line
1950 1963
Occupation DC-6 Planes (%) S-IV Saturn Project
Engineering 11.7 41.0
personnel
Tooling workers 18.0 7.5
Manufacturing 69.3 50.7
workers
The table shows a 250 percent increase for engineers, a 60 percent
decrease for machine workers, and a 28 percent decrease in laborers.
The blue collar jobs decreased and the white collar technical/professional
jobs increased considerably. In 1963, disproportionately fewer African-
Americans were capable of qualifying for the technical retraining programs,
meaning that once displaced, the worker was forced to seek employment
with other companies.
The pattern of displacement demonstrated in this example exposes a
trend that could easily be referred to as the "donut phenomenon." The
skilled middle gets knocked out by changing production technologies,
whereas the white collar positions experience accelerated increases,
and unskilled positions decrease at a slower rate than skilled positions.
The overall occupational distribution of African-Americans in the aero-
space industry for 1966 exhibited the usual concentration in the less
skilled, lower wage categories, with 82 percent employed in blue collar
positions. Unlike the previous examples, however, 40 percent of the
African-American workforce in white collar positions were evenly employed
as professionals or technicians. They still only accounted for 2.7
percent of the total technical and professional positions.
In choosing observation dates that correspond with the mid to late
sixties, the purpose was to account for the effects of the Civil Rights
Movement and the Urban Revolts. We saw that the conditions remained
relatively the same throughout this period. Therefore, prior to 1964,
we know that African-Americans were underrepresented in manufacturing,
and of those employed in the sector, they were concentrated in low wage
positions.
During the period leading into the mid-sixties, from 1947 on,
trends were unfolding in the manufacturing (goods producing) sector,
that would have increasing impact on labor in general and the African-
American workforce in particular. Between 1947 and 1962, productivity in
manufacturing increased by 50 percent.16 The meaning of this statistic
is illustrated in the following list.
LIST I - Changes in Labor Inputs Required to Produce a Given
Quantity of Goods. 17
1. The man-hours required to produce 1000 tons of steel fell from
14,700 in 1947 to 10,900 in 1962. A decrease of 26 percent.
2. The man-hours required to produce on automobile fell from 311
in 1947 to 151 in 1962. A decrease of 51 percent.
3. The man-hours required to produce 1000 tons of coal fell from
1300 in 1947 to 500 in 1962. A decrease of 62 percent.
4. The man-hours required to produce 1000 bushels of wheat fell
from 340 in 1947 to 120 in 1962. A decrease of 65 percent.
5. By 1964, one man operating one machine which performed 500
separate manufacturing functions was capable of completing a
job that formerly took 70 men to complete.
6. In a similar plant, 48 men using automated equipment turned out
a finished product in 20 minutes that formerly took 400 men
40 minutes to turn out. A 90 percent decrease in labor inputs,
and a 50 percent decrease in production time.
7. By 1964, an electronics plant where 200 men were used to
assemble 1000 units a day, only two were required to assemble
the same anount with the use of automated machines.
8. By 1964, a major government agency, using computers, had cut
its clerical work force from 13,000 to 3000 workers.
The list demonstrates quite effectively that automation (one of
the forms of technological innovation), has a pronounced impact on labor
as the production process is transformed. A formal definition of
automation, given by engineers, is stated as:
The transference of control functions from human beings
to computers and servomechanisms. 18
In a social context, however, automation implies a reduction in the
number of workers needed to produce a given quantity of goods and
services. A socio-economic index that registers its impacts is, of
course, (un)employment rates.
At this point it might be helpful to return to Chapter One for a
moment. Reviewing the tendencies inherent to the capital accumulation
process will more clearly define the relationships between the following
issues: productivity, automation, output, consumer demand, and (un)em-
ployment.
From Chapter One, we remember that the owners of capital can increase
the total amount of surplus value expropriated during the course of a
work day through any of the following methods. Since productivity is
equal to output per worker, one alternative available to the capitalist is
to increase the total number of workers employed at a given rate of
productivity. Another option is to introduce new technologies that enable
a smaller labor force to produce a standard quantity of goods. The
optimal situation for a capitalist would be to encounter a growing market
that accommodated both an increase in productivity (output per worker)
and total output. Herein lies the catch to the whole process. Surplus
value remains unrealized profits in the form of unsold goods until the
profits are realized through the sale of the goods in the market.
If there is substantial increase in the demand for a good, a decision
will be made to expand production. Without the introduction of a
new production technology, the result will be an increase in the em-
ployment of labor, assuming the full utilization of the labor force
already employed. However, the increased employment hinges upon a
growth in demand for the product. From the profit equation, s/(c+v),
we also know that an increase in labor's share of the production costs
(v), must be matched by a proportionate increase in surplus value (s),
otherwise the rate of profit will fall. Consequently we see that the
rate of surplus value s/v is another way of looking at the productivity
of labor.
Without a substantive increase in demand, the capitalist must find
a way to increase the profit rate given the limitation of the market.
In a highly competitive and saturated market, we can now understand the
importance of automation and other labor-displacing technology. As
opposed to increasing profits by producing and selling more goods at a
relative cost, in a tight competitive market, capitalists concentrate
instead upon increasing profits by reducing the costs of production. In
Chapter One we saw that this process gave rise to what Mandel called the
frantic search for technological rents. These technological rents are
nothing more than the monetary forms of competitive advantages gained
through the deployment of labor-displacing innovations. Automation,
therefore, regardless of its repercussions, has been capital's uncontrolled
response to heightened competition over a dwindling source of profits.
The following identity tends to guide the relationship between
productivity, output, and employment: With an increase in productivity
(output per worker), unless there is a proportionate increase in total
Output, actual and potential employment will decrease. This relation-
ship and the general trend in industry from 1947 to 1962 are clearly
outlined by the examples presented in Table 16.
(In reading this Table, the top figure in each category
represents 1947-57, and the bottom figure represents 1957-62.)
TABLE 16
Average Annual Percent Changes in Employment, Output and
Output-per-Worker for Selected Industries: 1947-57 and 1957-6219
Average Annual Percent Change: 1947-57
1957-62
employment
Industry total production output productivity
workers
Cement 1: 1.4 1.0 4.7 4.3
2: -1.7 -2.4 2.2 3.6
Coal 1: -6.0 -6.4 -2.3 5.6
2: -9.5 -10.4 -2.9 8.1
Glass 1: 1.4 1.5 1.6 0.5
Containers 2: 2.0 1.9 2.5 0.3
Iron and 1: 0.9 0.4 2.8 3.2
Steel 2: -3.8 -4.6 -2.3 3.4
Malt 1: -0.6 -2.2 0.8 3.7
liquors 2: -3.1 -2.6 1.7 5.2
Railroads 1: -3.1 * -1.1 3.9
2: -6.6 * -2.5 6.1
Petroleum 1: 0.5 -0.1 5.0 5.7
refining 2: -4.4 -4.9 1.9 7.0
Tires and 1: -1.8 -2.1 1.0 3.3
Tubes 2: -2.2 -2.4 3.2 6.1
Tobacco 1: -3.5 -3.6 1.0 5.2
cigars 2: -7.6 -8.1 1.9 9.8
In reviewing the table very briefly, the impacts of automation
on labor are quite prominent, particularly in those cases where decreases
in output are matched by rapid advancest in productivity. The coal in-
dustry is a prime example. It suffices to say at this point that the
examples presented in the table represent a trend that was not an isolated
phenomenon unique for the particular industries listed. Nor is the trend
confined to that particular period of economic history. The trend
clearly identifies the labor-displacing tendency that becomes a necessary
feature of the capitalist accumulation and development process. Here it
is appropriate to requote Mattick from the first chapter:
... the reduction of labor costs remains a necessary require-
ment for each single enterprise or corporation. Their
profitability increases as their labor costs decrease. It
is for this reason that the displacement of labor by capital
cannot be halted within the competitive capital formation
process, even though it undermines the structure of capital-
ist society.
The distortions of the capital formation process to which Mattick
refers were overtly evident by the early sixties. Between 1957 and 1962,
official unemployment rates averaged from 5.5 to 6.5 percent of the active
labor force.20 Official unemployment statistics have always understated
the true magnitude of the problem, because they only count those people
who are out of work and currently looking for jobs. These official
statistics do not include those people who have temporarily abandoned
their job hunting efforts, nor do they include those workers employed in
part-time positions who would actually prefer full-time employment. When
the subemployment figures are included with the standard unemployment
figures, the new rate for 1962 approximated 15 percent, as opposed to
the standard rate of 6 percent.21 The 15 percent rate therefore provides
a far more accurate appraisal of the system's (in)ability to provide a
decent standard of living for all those desiring to work.
Whereas the problem of unemployment had reached dramatic proportions
for the general population by 1962, the persistence of sub and unemploy-
ment for the African-American population had already entered the crisis
stage. To begin with, the unemployment rate for unskilled workers in
general averaged two and a half times the rate of unemployment for skilled
workers. From earlier presentation we witnessed the overwhelming concen-
tration of African-American workers in semi- and unskilled positions at
an average rate of 1.5 to 2 times the rate for white workers. Lack of
full-time employment opportunities increased the incidence of discrimination
experienced by African-American workers in competition with white workers
for a dwindling pool of production jobs. Including part-time workers,
the subemployment rate for the African-American population approached
50 percent in certain metropolitan areas. It should be remembered that
the final wave of displacement from southern agriculture during this
period intensified the employment crisis in a number of African-American
communities. In general, the average rate of subemployment for the Arican-
American workforce floated between 30 and 35 percent.22 From these
statistics we can see that the conomic conditions for low-income African-
American families in 1981 are similarto the conditions outlined in 1962.
Improvements have been negligible.
Statistically it is very difficult to place an accurate figure on
the rate of unemployment directly attributable to automation. However,
estimates of job losses resulting from automation provide some legitimate
boundaries for analysis. Using the following formula:2 3
total employment x percent increase in productivity =
jobs lost to automation
the American Foundation on Automation and Employment estimated that two
million jobs were lost to automation in 1962. This is equivalent to
approximately 40,000 jobs per week. Similar estimates include those given
by the then Secretary of Labor, W . Willard Wirtz, which stood at 25,000
to 30,000 jobs lost per week to automation. The statistics are not
nearly as straightforward as they are presented. This is due to the
fact that the impacts of automation are not always direct impacts result-
ing in the actual release of a worker.
The effects of automation can be manifested in a number of different
ways. Within a given industry, the introduction of a more efficient pro-
duction technology may result in a redistribution of market shares between
the individual firms that can afford the new technology vs. those that
cannot. This usually results in the less efficient firm having to close
shop, and the larger more solvent firms absorbing the abandoned market
share. The consequence is unemployment for the workers in the smaller
plant. Another hidden effect of automation relates to regional economic
development imbalances. Workers in different parts of the country may
experience greater difficulties in securing employment after having been
displaced.
Returning to the two million automation displaced jobs, it is ap-
propriate to incorporate an added dimension. Two million jobs were lost
to automation in 1962. However, in the same year, employment rose by
one million.24 This implies the creation of three million new jobs.
The problem is not solved at this juncture, it only becomes more com-
plicated. The issue of primary concern behind the creation of the new
jobs is not strictly related to the quantity of jobs created. The im-
portant issue for those carrying the weight of unemployment is clearly
related to the question of "What kinds of jobs are being created?".
A brief look at this question sharpens the perspective on the unemploy-
ment crisis confronting African-American communities.
Between 1947 and 1962, the number of white collar workers in the
labor force increased 50 percent, from 20 to 30 million. It is important
to note that this growth was marked by an average increase of over three
percent each year. During this same period, the number of blue collar
workers hovered between a high of 25.2 million from 1951 to 1956, to an
average of around 24 million. The high established between 1951 and 1956
coincided with the Korean War. As to be expected, once the war ended,
blue collar employment fell by eight percent in 1958.25
It is important to distinguish between white collar positions and
service worker positions within the general category of non-production
workers. From the statistics just presented, it is quite clear that
automation had triggered a permanent shift in the structure of the labor
force. In general the white collar positions can be identified as requir-
ing some standard level of formal education and/or training. For the
higher income white collar positions, at least four years of college
was required. In many cases blue collar workers found that their skills
were non-transferable in a white collar setting. The service sector,
which has traditionally employed a disproportionately high number of
African-Americans in low-wage jobs, is clearly distinct from the white
collar sector in this respect. In fact up through 1960, the distribution
of African-American workers in service worker positions outnumbered those
in white collar positions by at least 2.5 times.26
In other words an African-American worker displaced from a blue
collar job stood very little chance of securing a better paying position
in the white collar sector. With the white collar sector eliminated,
and transfers between firms in the production sector limited, a lower-
wage service sector position was one of the few options available. Lack
of transfers between sectors, limited mobility between industries,
and the presence of a low-wage service sector, contribute a partial
explanation to the crippling subemployment rates experienced by African-
American communities.
Within this context the following statistics have greater meaning.
Actual employment between 1957 and 1963 increased by 4.3 million in the
non-farm sector.27 Of this increase in jobs, only five percent were full-
time industrial placements. Sixty-five percent were government related,
and 14 percent were part-time jobs. These statistics point to the failure
of the industrial sector to generate new jobs for a constantly growing
workforce.
The impact of automation on the African-American workforce can be
defined in part as a problem of displacement, and in part as a problem
of access and occupational stagnation. In short, this means that given
the disproportionate concentration of African-American workers in the
low-wage blue collar positions, the initial waves of mechanization re-
duced the level of physical output required in a production process.
As levels of automation increased, the need for low wage laborers
continued to decrease. Increased automation also meant that machines
were capable of performing a greater number of functions that were
traditionally the responsibility of skilled craftsmen. The result was
a relative decrease in the number of craftsmen in general, and an abso-
lute decrease in particular industries.
The outcomes of this process are somewhat hidden. Within the blue
collar sector, the reduction of skilled positions meant that avenues of
vertical mobility for unskilled laborers and semi-skilled operatives
were being closed off. Consequently the vertical gap between white
collar and blue collar positions was also widening. As automation con-
centrated increasing portions of the production process in the machines
and required a reduced level of worker disgression within the production
process, it becomes evident that this relationship is in fact one of the
major factors behind the increasing separation between management and
production workers.
From the case examples presented earlier in the chapter, we know
that as late as 1966, the majority, over 95 percent, of the African-
American blue collar population was concentrated in the un- and semi-
skilled positions. From the preceeding scenario, the stagnating impact
of automation on African-American labor force advancement becomes evident.
It must also be kept in mind that the move of African-Americans out of
agriculture and services, and into industrial employment did not become
substantial until after 1940. However, we have seen that shortly after
the war, radical changes in the industrial sector were severely limiting
opportunities for late-comers to the process.
Up to this point the consequences of early automation have been
observed somewhat out of context. The economic repression of the
African-American worker cannot be isolated from the overriding socio-
political conditions of the general period from the mid-fifties to the
late sixties. The next chapter begins by establishing the context that
necessitated and determined the ineffectiveness of federal intervention
programs in the socio-economic arena. The transformed impetus guiding
federal intervention in the employment and training areas will be assessed
within a critique of the dominant theory and assumptions that guided
program and policy development.
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CHAPTER IV
The Case of Federal Intervention
The automation induced constraints on African-American labor force
advancement cannot be isolated from the general web of racial oppression
undercutting the socio-economic development of African-American communi-
ties. Whether the base of comparison was housing, education, health
care, income, poverty, etc., the relative levels of deprivation for the
African-American population greatly exceeded those of the white popula-
tion. In the previous chapter, we observed the disproportionate impact
of automation on African-American workers. The resultant conditions of
increased automation were not independent of the racially based factors
that were initially responsible for concentrating African-American workers
in the low-wage/low skill positions.
The motivating factors behind increasing automation were derived
from a set of considerations that were not heavily dependent upon the
objectives of racist intentions. However, once the process was set into
motion, the effects of structural unemployment combined with discrimina-
tory hiring practices, registered a disproportionate impact on the African-
American work force. The process of automation occurred without the
direct intervention of a single racist, yet when applied within a racially
stratified social order, this dynamic became a fundamental part of
racism. Engel's writes:
The "superstructure" of an individual society--the society's
customs, religions, politics, and social ideologies--will
affect both the relative importance and the form of economic
determinants. The economic situation is the basis, but the
various elements of the superstructure... also exercise their
influence upon the course of the historical struggles, and
in many cases preponderate in determining their form. The
economy is determinant only in the last instant. 1
Marx and Engels, Selected Works, II, 1951, p. 488.
Changing historical circumstances also change the forms in which,
and the institutions through which, economic relationships are made
manifest. It is within this context that the increasing presence of
federal intervention into the economic and social arenas must be viewed.
By 1964, the Civil Rights Movement, increasing unemployment, and
an intensification of urban poverty, had created an explosive environment
of mixed expectation, frustration, and anger in African-American communi-
ties across the country. A substantial number of African-Americans who
had migrated from the south as victims of agricultural mechanization
and Jim Crow social policies arrived in the cities only to be victimized
once again by technological change and a set of social and economic
institutions that was no less effective than Jim Crow. The consequence
was a chain reaction of innercity explosions across the nation in succes-
sive summers from 1964 to 1968. At the time of these revolts, 40 percent
of the African-American population was living below the poverty line,
and 50 percent of these poor families lived in the central cities.2 A
summary of 1964 shows that over 85 percent of the African-American
work force was distributed throughout the relatively low-wage blue collar,
service, farm laborer, and clerical occupational sectors.
Prior to the riots, however, the high rates of structural unemploy-
ment,brought on by technical progress in the manufacturing sector, had
been given far greater concern than the deteriorating socio-economic
conditions of the African-American population. This fact is mirrored in
the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962. Its major objective
was embodied in a single concept: the need to retrain skilled workers
who had been displaced by automation.3 A secondary consideration was
the training of unskilled, unemployed workers. However, retraining of
skilled workers absorbed such a large portion of the allocated resources
that the "unskilled" phase of the program remained relatively under-
developed.4
Much of the focus placed upon the retraining of skilled workers
can be traced to the relative strength of the craft unions. The contra-
diction forced onto the MDTA (1962) lay in the fact that the group of
workers reaping the benefits of the federally-sponsored programs were
also members of the craft and trade unions, which through racist policies,
denied access for occupational advancement to African-American workers.
As of 1962, African-Americans only represented 1.47 percent of all
apprentices in training.5 With these kinds of restrictions on advanced
or upgraded training, it can be inferred that the training received by
unskilled, unemployed worke-rs probably did not consist of much more than
operative work. It is important to add that a major component of train-
ing for unskilled workers under the Act was the on-the-jcb training
(OJT) program.
Within the context of program arrangement, government subsidies
were made available to the firms employing the "inexperienced and dis-
advantaged worker." The subsidy was granted on the assumption that the
firm was risking a productivity loss by taking on an untested and un-
conditioned worker. However, it is interesting to note that between
1963 and 1968, OJT placements increased from 2,000 to 125,000.6
Corporate consciousness, social responsibility, and moral obligation
are heavily discounted as probably reasons behind the rapid growth.
I would suggest the following explanation for the increase.
Firstly, the assumption that an unskilled worker was less productive
than an experienced worker may not have been entirely correct. (This
supposition will be advanced later on in the chapter.) With the in-
creased automation of production processes, more control over the entire
work/production process was being assumed by the machine, consequently
reducing the necessary requirements of the worker to perform adequately.
Productivity, therefore, would not be entirely dependent upon differences
between level of semi-skilled vs. unskilled workers. The outcome would
be based more upon an individual's level of socialization within the work
process. In other words, having adjusted to the social relations of the
production process, and having become synchronized with the rhythm of
the machine, the productivity of an unskilled OJT participant was
probably equivalent to that of a more experienced operative.
Coupled with the government subsidy, corporate interests were able
to increase surplus value at a below market wage for labor without a
noticeable sacrifice in productivity. Very simply, it was a profitable
arrangement. This may in part explain the absolute increase of African-
American operatives in those industries where the absolute number of
operative positions was declining.
In summary, the major emphasis of the NDTA of 1962 was on unemployment
resulting from automation and technological change; in other words
structural changes in employment opportunities. The basic assumption
centered around the concept that there existed a continuous process
whereby certain skills were being rendered obsolete as a consequence of
the many technological advances being made throughout industry.
During the early stages of program development and implementation,
eligibility for admission to training was restricted to unemployed heads
of households who had at least three years of consecutive work experience.
By design, MDTA was namely a retraining program for experienced workers.7
And by design it excluded those groups hardest hit by structural unemploy-
ment, people of color in economically depressed areas.
The African-American revolts transformed the traditionally isolated
base of manpower policy development into a key component of the War on
Poverty as declared by the "Great Society" Johnson administration in
1964. The declared objectives of the "War on Poverty" legislation were
to provide an escape from poverty and to upgrade the workforce. For
example, a series of legislative amendments adopted between 1963 and 1966
expanded the scope of the MDTA program considerably. The revised MDTA
training programs were to be divided between a) training for labor
shortage occupations, and b) training specifically tailored to the
needs of the economically disenfranchised.8 Beginning in 1967, 25 percent
of the enrollees had to be disadvantaged youths, 40 percent had to be
disadvantaged adults, and 35 percent of the enrollees had to be trained
in occupations where skilled manpower was in short supply.9 Other amend-
ments included: 1) extending the maximum length allowed for the training
period so that occupations requiring more extensive training could be
included; 2) increasing the emphasis on remedial education; 3) in-
creasing trainee's compensation allowance to $10 above the unemployment
allowance in various states; and 4) establishing local advisory boards. 1 0
In viewing these programs as a collective response to a set of
changing conditions, their development and implementation must be seen
within the context of the socio-political dynamics that brought the
programs into being. While proclamations of the "Great Society" were
being sounded, it must be maintained that the fundamental basis of the
social and economic structures had remained unchanged. Under the code
name of "law and order," old laws were redefined and new laws passed to
insure the spatial containment of urban core African-Americans. For
example, Public Law 831 was reactivated for use against "rioting blacks"
instead of communists. 1 1
Originally known as the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act of 1950, these acts were designed to protect
the U.S. against certain "un-American" and subversive activities by
requiring the registration of communist organizations and other groups.
Title II of the Act states very clearly that the Attorney General,
during declared Presidential emergencies, is authorized to hold in deten-
tion centers persons believed "probably will engage in... acts of espionage
or sabotage." It is important to recognize that these are persons who
have not yet committed a crime or an act, but persons who might do so.12
In its 1968 report, Guerilla Warfare Advocates in the U.S., the
House Un-American Activities Committee recommended a plan by which
African-American citizens, such as the militants who advocated self-
defense during the mid-sixties rebellions, could be "isolated and
destroyed in a short period of time."13 As a point of reference, the
plan was released on May 6, 1968, one month after the assasination of
Martin Luther King. Amidst all the eulogizing, it was still business
as usual. Sections of the plan are excerptelas follows: 4
... Once the ghetto is sealed off, and depending upon the
violence being perpetrated by the guerillas, the following
actions could be taken by the authorities:
1) A curfew would be imposed in the enclosed isolated
area. No one would be allowed out of or into the
area after sundown.
2) During the night the authorities would not only patrol
the boundary lines, but would also attempt to control
the streets, and if necessary, send out foot patrols
through the entire area. If the guerillas attempted to
either break out of the area or to engage the authorities
in open combat they would be readily suppressed.
3) During a guerilla uprising most civil liberties would
have to be suspended, search and seizure operations
would be instituted during the daylight hours, and anyone
found armed or without proper identification would
immediately be arrested. Most of the people in the ghetto
would not be involved in the guerilla operation and, under
conditions of police and military control, some would help
in ferreting out the guerillas. Their help would be
invaluable.
4) If the guerillas were able to hold out for a period of time,
then the population of the ghetto would be classified
through an office for the "control and organization of the
inhabitants." This office would distribute "census cards"
which would bear a photograph of the individual, a letter
of the district in which he lives, his house and street
number. The classification would aid the authorities in
knowing the exact location of any suspect and who is in
control of any given district. Under such a system, movement
would be proscribed and the ability of the guerilla to move
freely from place to place seriously curtailed.
5) The population within the ghetto would be exhorted to work
with the authorities and to report both on guerillas and
any suspicious activity they might note. The police
agencies would be in a position to make immediate arrests,
without warrants, under suspension of guarantees usually
provided by the Constitution.
6) Acts of overt violence by the guerillas would mean that they
had declared a "state of war" within the country and, there-
fore, would forfeit their rights as in wartime. The McCarran
Act provides for various detention centers to be operated
throughout the country and these might well be utilized for
the temporary imprisonment of warring guerillas.
7) The very nature of the guerilla operation as presently en-
visioned by certain Communists and black nationalists would
be impossible to sustain. According to the most knowledgeable
guerilla war experts in this country the revoluationaries
could be isolated and destroyed in a short period of time.
A brief assessment of the excerpts brings to light two very im-
portant observations. The first should be rather straightforward, but
is still worth mentioning. Throughout the text of the report, the
"ghetto" is continually referred to with tones more appropriately used
when speaking of another country or any outside aggressor. This, of
course, is the issue to be identified. The socio-economic segregation
of African-Americans is clearly mflected through comparative standard
of living statistics. Concurrently, a manifestation of this condition is
reinforced by the geo-spatial segregation and concentration of African
Americans in the urban cores of the nation's cities. The combination of
these factors gave rise to what was called the "internal colony" theory
of African-American exploitation. The important point is the fact that
the marginality and alienation of the African-American population was
acknowledged by both sides of the issue.
The second observation is located in "item 6" of the Un-American
Activities Committee report. Reading into the statute one can readily
project the expanded use of detention centers as concentration camps.
The tactic has been deployed previously against the Asian-Americans
during World War II. And it was only the Asian-Americans who were
incarcerated, even though the United States was also at war against the
Germans and the Italians. In the event of an officially classified
"internal threat," it should not take too much imagination to perceive
the consequences for the African-American population, given such condi-
tions.
The key issue which should remain at the forefront is the fact that
the manpower programs implemented were not derived from a coordinated
and established policy base. In the throes of a social/political crisis,
the government reacted with a crisis-oriented, ad hoc manpower policy
that was more closely related to a "riot insurance" policy, as opposed
to a tool directing the efficient allocation and development of labor
throughout all sectors of the market.
This position is evidenced by the generally fragmented nature of the
set of policies and programs developed and implemented. New programs
were formulated to address'the special employment problems of various
groups (youth, uneducated, elderly, people of color, etc.). With each
program intending to assist a particular target group, each also specified
different objectives, had different approaches for solving problems, and
consequently evolved different standards for judging effectiveness.
Also related to the question of process was the inefficient system
of delivery. The dominant tendency was to disperse manpowefunctions
among a number of different departments and agencies. Each agency would
draw its authority from a different legislative act, and each act imposed
its own conditions on the utilization of funds, and the funding cycles
were dependent upon the level of government allocating the aid (federal,
state, or local). Literally over a dozen federal agencies have been
involved in the distribution of manpower services. These included:
the Department of Labor; the Economic Development Administration of the
Department of Commerce; the Department of Housing and Urban Development;
and three branches of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
including the Bureau of Adult and Vocational Education in the Office of
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Education. In brief, as the War on Poverty expanded, the agencies
involved in administering its programs proliferated into a complicated
bureaucratic network that became increasingly difficult to administer
efficiently.
Generally speaking, the evolution of manpower legislation is usually
viewed as corresponding with the change of administrations, from Johnson
to Nixon. Along this continuum several trends in manpower development
can be identified representing specific shortcomings of the system as a
whole.
One of the shortcomings is implied by the fact that manpower programs
can be easily targeted as political casualties. This level of vulnerabil-
ity clearly attests to the marginal nature of the program, and reflects on
the general position of the target populations within the overall socio-
economic hierarchy. By having been deployed so haphazardly, the programs
and their client populations were inadvertently set up as targets of
conservative attacks. Also worth noting is the fact that the initial social
crises which had precipitated the rapid growth of these programs had for
the most part run their course by the end of Nixon's first term.
With the manpower effort no longer having to be concerned with pla-
cating the severely disenfranchised, quite expectedly, a transition in the
target population of programs transpired. As opposed to confronting the
dilemma related to issues concerning the poorest of the poor, under the
Nixon administration a new avenue of policy development was pursued aimed
at tapping the possible benefits of courting a "black privileged" class.
Black capitalism was the catch phrase during this period. The process
in general was somewhat similar to neo-colonial attempts to breed a
national bourgeoisie that would be capable of functioning as a proxy on
behalf of neo-colonial interests. This effort by the Nixon administration
should not be taken out of context, for Nixon is quoted as telling one
of his aides the following: "Give them all the rhetoric they want to
hear, just as long as it doesn't cost anything." 1 6
Towards the end of the Johnson administration and the War on Poverty,
policy-makers in recognizing the need to enlist the direct input of private
enterprises established Jobs in the Business Sector (JOBS) in 1968. The
program itself was in part coordinated by the National Alliance of Busi-
nessmen. The conceptualization of the program was strong, however, its
operationalization was significantly weakened by structural constraints of
the labor market. From Chapter 3, we remember that the number of produc-
tion workers relative to non-production workers was declining in the manu-
facturing sector. In programmatic terms one would expect the number of
placement slots to decrease over time. It should be maintained that a
good portion of the JOBS clientele was unskilled and inexperienced. It
is for this reason that training placements were generally associated with
semi-skilled blue collar positions. In reviewing figures for the program,
some statistics outline one of the program's major weaknesses.
Between 1969 and 1973, the number of available training slots per
year decreased by 62 percent. Program enrollment was also declining
during this period, however the number of enrollees outpaced the avail-
able placements by an average 1.4:1.17 Along with this particular dynamic,
the per capital funding for each enrollee declined during that same five
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year period by 33% without discounting for inflation. The decrease in
on-the-job training placements was a function of structural changes in the
economy, but it was also compounded by a general attitude on the part of
private sector interests which over time functioned to further isolate
the manpower sector from the mainstream labor market.
Given its "Great Society" roots, manpower policy and programs had
come to be seen as a tool in the anti-poverty program pushed by liberals.
As the threat of African-American violence subsided, the obligatory nature
of private sector participation subsided. Voicing the general attitude of
private sector interests towards the manpower sector, Bakke states:
When it is well understood, however, that Congress and the Ad-
ministration have authorized, and the leading manpower program
administrators have accepted, the mission to concentrate their
attention on the disadvantaged unemployed, those (agencies and
individuals) concerned with fiscal, monetary, trade, income,
urban and regional development, and military policies may be
excused for saying, "What significance does manpower policy have
for our task?" I am not aware of any statement from such sources
as bold and icy as that. But in conversations with some of them,
I sense an assessment of the utility, for their purposes, of
close collaboration with the manpower authorities as about equi-
valent to close collaboration with the Salvation Army. 18
The accuracy of Bakkeb statement is reflected in part by the de-
creasing number of overall on-the-job training opportunities under the
MDTA which fell from 144,500 placements in 1967 to 70,000 placements by
1973. 9 Funding for the OJT component remained more or less the same
during this period.
With private sector support for manpower placement efforts shrink-
ing, the post-War on Poverty focus shifted to the public sector. With
rapidly increasing demand for public services at both state and local
levels, along with the urban fiscal crises, forced the federal government
to give financial support to programs which place the unemployed in
public-sector positions. Substantial funding for this operation was
initiated in 1970.
This approach reinforced the departure in orientation of the Nixon
administration from the Johnson administration by concentrating efforts
on higher placed members of the workforce, versus concentrating on the
unskilled and uneducated. The two pieces of federal manpower legislation
enacted during this period were the Public Service Careers program and
the Public Employment Program. Under already existing manpower programs
such as Neighborhood Youth Corps, Operation Mainstream, and the Work
Incentive Program, individuals had been placed in the public sector.
However, the enrollees in those programs were mainly given "work experi-
ence" positions that usually only paid minimum wage. It was a rare occasion
when an enrollee from one of the aforementioned programs was placed in
an unsubsidized position.
The two new programs often involved the employment of professionals
and paraprofessionals at significantly higher payscales then found in the
other manpower programs. The success of the Public Services Careers
Program, and Public Employment Program, in reducing the unemployment rate
was limited. In 1972 which was the peak employment year for these pro-
grams in the 1969-1973 period, there were only 226,000 public employment
placements, which meant that with at least 7.5 million unemployed in 1972,
the programs could have only reduced the unemployment rate by at most
three percent of the total unemployed.20 A major criticism of the
program was the accusation that it skimmed the most employable of the
unemployed workers and had little impact on seriously disadvantaged
groups.21 This is again consistent with the political consequences of
a reversal in ideological trends.
The Public Employment Program which came out of the Emergency
Employment Act of 1971, set the stage for the continued trend towards
decentralization under the Nixon administration through the enactment of
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the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1974. As it was
demonstrated earlier in the chapter, ad hoc attempts to centralize man-
power planning from the top had resulted in a discontinuous mass of
policies and programs that were not always capable of adapting to the
particular conditions of a given environment. The trend towards decen-
tralization was based upon the supposition that the federal government
controlled the effective channels through which to raise revenue, however,
it could only be through the transition of authority for manpower develop-
ment and training from the federal government to the local governments
that manpower programs could be truly responsive to the problems of those
they were intended to serve.
The transition of authority for manpower development and training
from the federal government to the state and local governments meant that
the smaller governing units, within the limit of the law, were responsible
for designing, implementing, and to some extent evaluating manpower pro-
grams. This decentralized approach, which took effect in fiscal year
1974, gave to eligible local and state governments the authority to
determine, develop, and operate related manpower policies and programs.
The state and local governments were also granted the option to delegate
some or all of their authority to other public or private organizations.
Funding for these prime sponsors was carried out through a form of revenue
sharing.
With the sub-units of government in control of development and im-
plementation it is important to raise the following point. The predom-
inance of a states rights movement trend was clearly in line with the
generally conservative mood of the country. Within the context of African-
American history "states rights" have always been associated with the
attempts of state governments to maintain socially repressive standards
void of federal intervention. In a similar vein, it has already been
pointed out in this chapter that the thrust of manpower policy in the
Nixon years was away from the extremely disadvantaged, and directed more
towards the qualified workers populating the ranks of the unemployed.
With African-Americans disproportionately concentrated within the lower
ranks of the unemployed, the level to which they would be (dis)enfran-
chised was entirely dependent upon the socio-political conditions of the
state. Naturally, this uncertainty warps the presupposition that a more
localized control apparatus over manpower service delivery necessarily
means a more truly responsive system.
The key issue relating to the method of revenue sharing is the fact
that by decategorizing the allocation of funds, federal appropriations
were no longer earmarked for specific programs. This meant that the
prime sponsors (recipients of the funds) could determine what programs
to fund after they had identified their target population and assessed
its need. Quite naturally this paved the way for an increased measure
of coercive leverage hostile political machines could exercise against
100
programs that were considered political threats.
In a brief summary, manpower policy and programs were developed
as a reaction to a social crisis. Its post-1964 origins therefore be-
come associated with attempts to reduce the level of alienation experienced
by the marginal and disadvantaged worker in the laborforce. As a result,
given its initial clientele of poor people of color, the programs and
their participants were continually isolated from mainstream labor
markets. Aside from the politics of the programs themselves, when looked
at from the following angles a rather blunt appraisal of their effective-
ness is presented.
In 1972, a peak year for first-time enrollments of 1,973,000 appli-
cants, there existed a total of 1,562,300 placements. These placements
represented only 25 percent of the total unemployed. In the context of
employment creating devices, their effectiveness is questionable on the
basis of the fact that following the peak years of the Viet Nam War un-
employment rates registered as follows:2 3
Year Unemployment Rate
1971 5.3
1972 4.9
1973 4.1
1974 4.8
1975 7.9
1976 7.0
1977 6.2
The drastic fluctuations in the rate would seem to indicate that the
manpower labor market is really incapable of functioning as an employment
stabilization tool. This condition is due to the fact that being a
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tangential sector of the private sector market, manpower program
viability is in fact dependent upon the private sector activity.
In a comparison of rates of poverty, the following table shows that
whereas the overall rate of poverty has declined, the relative deprivation
of African-Americans to whites has become standardized at 3:1 to 3.5:1.24
TABLE 17
Percent of Persons Below the Poverty Level25
Race
Year White Black Ratio
1959 18.3 56.2 3:1
1966 11.3 39.8 3.5:1
1969 9.5 31.0 3.2:1
1975 9.7 29.3 3:1
1977 8.9 29.0 3.3:1
An important point to raise here is the fact that the standards for
measuring poverty have changed over time. In 1959, the standard used
for poverty represented 54 percent of the median U.S. income level,
$2943/$5417, whereas in 1970, the standard of $3970 represented 41 percent
of the median U.S. income, $3970/$967026 If the poverty standard were to
be represented once again by the 54 percent standard, the related poverty
level would have been $5221 and the total number of persons falling below
the actual poverty margin in 1971 would have been 36.6 million, as opposed
to 25.5 million. Using the 54% standard Table 17 would be represented
as follows:
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TABLE 18
Percent of Persons Below the Poverty Level
(54 Percent of Median Income Standard)2 7
Race
Year White Black Ratio
1959 26.7 66.8 2.5:1
1966 17.3 50.9 3.0:1
1969 14.0 42.0 3.0:1
1975 14.5 38.2 2.6:1
1977 13.3 38.5 2.9:1
From both tables, it is clear that the manpower programs have had
limited effect on substantially increasing the socio-economic mobility of
the economically disenfranchised African-American family. In fact, in
1922, a study suggested that 70 percent of the families in poverty for a
given year were in poverty the year before. Of the remaining 30 percent,
11 percent were accounted for by way of death or imprisonment, and 19
percent managed to raise their incomes above the poverty margin. Of the
19 percent, 12 percent were still within $2000 of the poverty line.
It was also shown that families who escaped from poverty in any one year
also stood a significant probability of falling back into poverty in suc-
ceeding years. As a consequence, data on poverty would probably indicate
a low degree of economic mobility among the low income population.28
The initial thesis of the anti-poverty program was that the major
employment problems of low-income people stemmed primarily from their own
limitations as workers. The thesis over time expanded to include assump-
tions that many disadvantaged members of the labor force needed additional
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social services in order to gain, retain, and compete for higher paying
positions which would enable them to improve their standard of living.
The initial thesis of the poverty programs is closely related to what
is usually identified as the human capital theory. Its fundamental orien-
tation focuses on the inadequacies of the worker, and when applied by
conservatives vs. liberals, the theory yields different policy and program
results.
As an aspect of traditional labor economics, the human capital
analysis is well coordinated with the "queue theory" of labor economics.
According to this theory employers rank present and potential employees
along a single ordinal vector based on the worker's respective marginal
productivity. Simply put, employers will base their hiring patterns
upon their own assessment of an additional worker's ability to match or
surpass the rate of surplus value already standardized for a particular
production process for a given workforce in general. Therefore marginal
productivity is nothing more than the ouput generated by a single addi-
tional worker. Within the context of the theory, marginal productivity is
generally the function of the degree to which an individual develops
some level of manual dexterity and/or mental aptitude. It can easily be
seen that the roles of education and training are given primary considera-
tion as alternatives through which labor can increase its marginal pro-
ductivity.
From this framework, differences in wages, salaries, and therefore
income are the result of differences in the marginal productivity between
individual workers in the same job, or groups of workers in different
occupational sector: the determinants being education, ability and
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experience. Consequently, within the neo-classical framework, issues
of poverty are classically attributed to the victim via the logic of the
model. At the bottom line:29
If an individual's income is too low, his productivity
is too low. His income can be increased only if his
productivity can be raised.
An assessment of the model exposes a number of weaknesses and in-
accuracies. The fundamental weakness of the theory is its incompatibility
with real life situations. First of all, the model assumes that employers
view all employees the same, except for differences in their marginal
productivities. Hopefully by now the reader can readily identify the
many ways in which this assumption is false. In its present form the
theory lacks the ability to accurately account for racially determined
income and employment patterns. And when racism is introduced, it is pre-
sented as a preferred choice by white employers and employees for which
they are willing to pay a price in hidden economic costs. By placing a
cost of racism on the racist, in a perverted sort of way the model justi-
fies/rationalizes racists and their "isms" on the basis of free market
mechanisms. The model also fails to acknowledge the critical issues con-
cerning equality of access to "human capital" developing opportunities.
By restricting the extent of the model to an isolated internal represen-
tation of the labor market, void of any superstructural analysis, the
human capital theory has proved to be an insufficient base from which
to develop effective policies and programs.
The relative impacts of education are questioned by the following
tables.
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TABLE 19
Income Returns on Education by Race, 196130
Education White Black Ratio
Elementary
Less than 8 years 3556 2294 .627:1
8 years 4911 3338 .680:1
High School
1 to 3 years 5882 3449 .586:1
4 years 6390 4559 .713:1
College
1 to 3 years 7344 5525 .742:1
4 years 9315 7875 .845:1
TABLE 20
Median Income Comparisons of Education by Race, 197531
Median Income Percent Distribution
Education Black White Ratio Black White
Elementary
Less than 8 years $3871 4843 .799:1 24.3 8.3
8 years 5149 6640 .775:1 7.5 8.3
High School
1 to 3 years 5356 7864 .681:1 21.2 14.3
4 years 7468 10,463 .714:1 30.3 35.1
College
1 to 3 years 8300 10,656 .779:1 11.0 16.4
4 years 10,573 14,656 .721:1 3.6 10.0
Post-Graduate 14,539 17,622 .825:1 2.0 7.6
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In comparing these two tables we find that categorical comparisons
within levels of educational attainment show the median income ratios
between African-Americans and whites approaching unity. However, these
categorical trends misrepresent the overall replationship between African-
American and white income distributions. A more accurate reflection of
this relationship is shown by the column marked "percent distribution"
in Table 20. From this array of figures we can see that African-Americans
are disproportionately concentrated in the lower and middle sections of
the educational attainments spectrum. Consequently this general position
is reflected through the system-wide median income ratio, which shows a
much wider disparity between African-American and white incomes. For
the related periods indicated by the tables, in 1961 the ratio of African-
American to white median incomes was listed as .53:1, the corresponding
figure for 1975 was .61:1.32 The overall ratios indicate a marked depar-
ture from the much higher intra-categorical ratios representing levels of
educational attainment. The lower overall figures also imply quite
heavily that as late as 1975, the intergenerational effects of the plan-
tation economy on educational attainment for elder African-Americans are
still being accounted for in current socio-economic determinations.
It should be mentioned that among the younger age groups of African-
Americans, educational deficits have been substantially reduced. In 1940,
for example, the median for years of schooling completed for the general
population was 8.6 years for adults over 25 years of age and 5.7 years
for African-Americans in the same age bracket.33 By 1972 the figures
were 12.2 median years of schooling completed, while African-Americans
had raised their figure to 10.3 median years of schooling completed.34
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These gains are even more clearly highlighted by isolating the attain-
ment levels of the 25-29 age group. In 1940 the educational gap at this
age level was 3.3 years (total--10.3 years, African-Americans--7.0 years),
but by 1972 it was reduced to 0.4 years, (total--12.7 years, African-
Americans--12.3 years).35 The issue of quality is not engaged in these
statistics.
In a quick review of Tables 19 and 20, a generally accepted sup-
position is brought to the forefront. The monetary payoff of educational
attainment is less for African-Americans than for the at-large white pop-
ulation. In fact, looking at the figures presented for 1975 in Table 20,
we find that the median income for an African-American college graduate
was only $110 more than the median income for a white high school graduate.
This meant in quasi-economic terms that a college degree for an African-
American was worth only $110 relative to what could have been earned if
he was a white high school graduate. This condition is sharply contrasted
against the quasi-economic worth of a college degree for a white person.
Using the same base of comparison against a white high school graduate,
a degree is worth $4,193 to a white college grad. This is 38 times
greater or a 3700 percent increase over the $110 improvement in median
income experienced by the African-American degree holder vs. the white
high school graduate.
Worth further consideration is the following relationship. Referring
once again to Table 20, it is interesting to note that the higher incidence
of income equality occur at the opposite poles of the educational attain-
ment spectrum, identified by "post-graduate" and "less than 8 years" of
formal education. The mid-range of the spectrum represented by the
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high school years, registers the greatest disparity related to
income disparities. The explanation to be offered is by no means con-
clusive. However, it does engage some of the basic issues presented
in previous chapters.
If we make the assumption that those workers with a high school
education would most likely be found in blue collar positions, we would
then be led to the following conclusions. Knowing that the number of
production worker positions have been declining over time, we can safely
infer that the competition generated by a growing number of capable
workers over a dwindling pool of jobs was heightened. From the infor-
mation documented earlier, I would suggest that what we see in that
particular section of Table 20 is a replication of discriminatory hiring
practices that historically have always intensified under conditions of
scarcity. This pattern was identified during Reconstruction, the labor
movement, and so on.
The figures also register the existence and impacts of a dual labor
market, where employment opportunities for African-American metropolitan
workers are generally limited to the secondary sector. This sector
is characteristically described as being a low productivity, low wage,
labor intensive and unstable sector. 36 In an application to real con-
ditions, the dual labor market theory would suggest that upon graduation
from high school, the innercity graduate would have less employment
opportunities to choose from, and of those available, only a few would
allow access to primary sector positions. In brief, the primary sector
is associated with high productivity, high wage, extended market firms.
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Within the parameters of the dual labor market theory it is necessary
to add a qualifier.
The basic foundation of the theory is correct in identifying the
employment effects of a structurally bifurcated labor market. How-
ever, it is also worth noting that within the primary sector industries,
some workers are placed in positions that are no better than their
counterparts in the secondary sector. It is for this reason that the
structural orientation of the theory must be broadened to accommodate
not only an analysis of cross-sectoral structural constraints, but
also the vertical constraints on mobility within sectors that is a
part of discriminatory hiring practices. Table 21 provides information
which identifies the tandem impacts of not only racism and dual labor
market structures, but also implicitly identifies the repressive element
contributed by a segmented educational system.
TABLE 21
Education and Occupation by Race for Males, 1970 (Blue Collar Positions) 3 7
Elementary High School College
8 years 1-3 yrs. 4 yrs. 1-3 yrs. 4 yrs.
or less
Occupation total black total black total black total black total black
Craftsmen 25.1 15.1 25.6 16.1 26.4 17.1 14.4 13.6 3.3 4.3
Operatives 29.0 29.6 27.3 34.2 20.6 32.6 9.4 18.1 1.4 3.7
Laborers 11.6 22.6 9.9 16.1 5.3 11.3 3.4 6.0 .5 1.5
Service 11.7 17.6 10.9 18.0 7.5 14.7 7.0 13.2 1.4 3.9
Total % of
categorical 77.4 84.9 73.7 84.4 59.8 75.7 34.2 50.9 6.6 18.4
workforce
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Table 21 is a good illustration of a cross sampling of potential
explanations capable of accounting for the overextended concentration of
educated African-Americans in blue collar positions relative to the edu-
cational attainment levels of the white population. In the craft posi-
tions we observe what is by now a familiar pattern. Up through the high
school years, African-Americans were considerably underrepresented in the
crafts. Even with a high school diploma chances were two to one that a white
high school graduate would be accepted into an apprentice program with the
high school degree than would an African-American. Furthermore, with the
acquisition of the diploma, the number of white workers represented in the
blue collar sector declines by close to 20 percent, from 23.7 to 59.8. The
corresponding figure for African-Americans was 10 percent. Seen in this
light, the upward mobility factor of a high school diploma for a white
graduate had twice the impact of a high school degree held by an African-
American.
Even with some college experience, 50.9 percent of the African-
Americans in that particular education attainment cohort were still blue
collar workers, whereas the corresponding figure for the white population
was 34.2 percent. One other item worth pointing out is the increasing
margin of difference distinguishing the distribution of operatives through-
out all educational attainment levels, between African-American and white
workers. At the elementary attainment level, operatives are about evenly
represented within both groups, at 29.0 for whites and 29.6 for African-
Americans, respectively. At the high school level the marginal difference
has increased by 7 percentage points at 27.3 and 34.2 for dropouts, 12
percentage points for high school graduates. In the case of the high
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school graduates, once again we witness a noticeably decreased impact on
the occupation distribution for African-American diploma holders relative
to the upward mobility of a high school diploma on white worker distribu-
tion. With a diploma the representation of white workers in semi-skilled
positions declined by 25 percent. The figure for African-American workers
was 4.5 percent. The examples are endless.
Within Table 21 we can see evidence of the dual labor market theory
on the basis that certain selected job opportunities are limited for African-
Americans. Either through geographic disolocation or discriminatory hiring
practices, openings are not available to African-Americans as they are to
the general white population. Consequently, African-Americans are found
being forced to take jobs that on the basis of societal standards do not
provide incomes commensurate with the level of education attained. Another
point to bring out is the following: It seems that the concentration and
overrepresentation of African-American workers in semi-skilled positions
was in fact the function of job stratification and segregation. As the
automation of production processes increased, the flow of white workers
into the white collar sector far outpaced the flow for African-American
workers. This in part explains the higher educational level for African-
American workers in certain blue collar positions relative to white workers.
Basically, certain white collar positions, explicitly or implicity, were
being reserved for white workers. Another issue related to this whole dy-
namic relates very clearly to the added burden of proof that white employers
tend to project into an African-American worker. The greater proportion of
African-American workers in semi-skilled positions, with higher educational
attainment levels relative to a cross-section of semi-skilled white workers,
would seem to bear this position out to a degree. Looked at from a
112
different angle, it requires less for the white worker to get his foot
in the door; whereas the higher level of educational attainment required
of the African-American worker is added insurance for the employer that
the job will get done.
The implications of this attitude are presented as follows: 38
Automation results in machinery of a more automatic nature directed
by highly automatic controls. Both machinery and control devices
are complex and sophisticated in their actions, and must be care-
fully adjusted and attended to achieve performance requirements.
Therefore, employees manning and servicing this equipment need a
higher degree of understanding and education. They will require
additional training, higher types of skills, and even new levels of
education. Intense concentration seems to be necessary. Thus, the
job content of individual tasks associated with the new machinery
will require more skill. An upgrading effect is obvious.
In short, the position being presented here suggests that a more highly
automated machine requires a more highly skilled worker. James Bright in
his study, Automation and Management, presents evidence which clearly chal-
lenges this position. A brief synopsis of the study is appropriate at this
point. Bright summarizes the underlying assumptions behind the upgrading
hypothesis. These include three basic notions:39
1. Automatic machinery requires higher degrees of worker skill and/
or training than does conventional equipment.
2. More engineers and technicians are required to design, build, in-
stall, and/or operate highly automatic machinery.
3. The average workforce cannot meet the demands of new equipment
without elaborate retraining.
These notions are graphically illustrated below: 4 0
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Graph II- How Dmands on the Worker Are Commonly Assumed
to Increase With Automation
"Skill vs Automation"
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In analyzing the labor process and automation paths, Bright identi-
fies a number of relationships between mechanization and the worker. Be-
low is what could be considered a checklist of tasks carred out by a
worker during the course of a production cycle.40
1. Physical effort--the expenditure of energy through bodily move-
ment either to manipulate materials and tools or to control
something in the environment.
2. Mental effort--the use of mental powers to sense and analyze
job requirements and to decide and direct the necessary response
action. This contribution also implies the need for atten-
tion and concentration.
3. Manipulative skill--the employment of specialized physical
dexterity, presumably acquired only by training and/or prac-
tice, or possibly by unique physical aptitudes.
4. Education--the knowledge of and competence in the use of a
formally organized body of theory and fact apparently required
by the task.
5. Experience--elements of ability, comprehension, and judgment
that are only acquired by practice at the task.
6. Responsibility--the extent to which the operator controls
safety, product quality, or productivity of the activity with
respect to persons, equipment, and/or materials.
7. Decisionmaking--the extent to which the worker must or can
make judgments that have a significant effect on successful
performance.
8. Productivity--the extent to which the worker increases output
above an expected norm by contributing exceptional effort,
skill, knowledge, or ability.
From Bright's list we can assume that as the character of mechanization
applied to a given job is changed, the contributions of the worker will
also change in some aspect. Therefore, in order to understand how automa-
tion affects workforce skills, we must consider how each of the demands
in a given job is affected by increasing degrees of mechanization and
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automatic control.
In focusing our attention on items 6. and 7. of the list, Responsi-
bility and Decisionmaking, it can be easily understood how an automatic,
self-monitoring, and self-correcting machine assumes the tasks formerly
delegated to the worker. A perfect example is sited by Braverman where he
observed that at least 2.5 to 3 years were required to at least become
moderately familiar with the tasks of being a machinist. However, with
the introduction of numerical control machines, an operator can be trained
in the space of six months. The difference therefore lies in the distinc-
tion separating a machine operator from an experienced machinist. In
Chapter One we explored some of the motivating factors behind increased
automation and the reduction of worker control over the production process.
The question being considered is whether or not greater demands are made
upon the worker who only monitors a machine, versus the worker who must
plan, and negotiate the actions of the machine. By way of suggestion, the
point should be fairly clear. When a pattern of predetermined actions can
be mechanically achieved, there is no particular need for the understanding,
training and education of the operator that existed when adjustment and
control lay in the operator's hands. On the basis of these observations,
the relationships depicted in Graph II are more accurately represented
by the interactions of the level of workers' skill required and automation
shown in Graph III.
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Graph III- How Demands On the 'iorker Increase Jith Automation4 1
"Skill versus Autoration"
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Graph III summarizes the results of Bright's research rather neatly.
Very simply, as the machine assumes greater control of the work process
through increased automation, after a certain point, the demands on
the worker during the production cycle decrease. For a given array of
production jobs, the infinitely increased ability of capital to disag-
gregate production processes and move to remote parts of the world in
order to better exploit lower wage costs would tend to support the basic
argument of Bright's thesis. The conceptual application of the hypothesis
is aptly presented by Folker Frobel in his book The New International
42
Division of Labor:
The development and refinement of technology and job organization
makes it possible to decompose complex production process into
elementary units such that even unskilled labor can be easily
trained in quite a short period of time to carry out these rudi-
mentary operations. In this way skilled labour receiving higher
wages can be replaced by un- or semi-skilled labor receiving lower
wages. If it is impossible, for economic reasons, to use machinery
in place of fragmented operations, then the access to, and use of,
a very cheap, un- or semi-skilled work-force provides the opportunity
for an improved valorization of capital. The fragmentation of jobs
has progressed so far, especially in manufacturing, that the execu-
tion of all processes now often requires a training period of no
more than a few weeks even for unskilled labor. In this way capital
acquires a monopoly of the knowledge related to the control and
execution of the labor process: this knowledge is removed from the
production process, which is' managed exclusively by capital...
Bourgeois institutions like the traditional school system contribute
to the successful implementation of discipline by instilling such
capitalist virtues as subservience, obedience and punctuality.
In light of Bright's conclusions and the evidence presented in pre-
vious chapters a number of conclusions can be drawn about the social and
economic consequences of technological rationalization on the position
of the African-American workforce and the African-American population as
a whole.
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This chapter began with an appraisal of federal efforts to compen-
sate for the disenfranchising effects of both social and economic insti-
tutions on African-American development. The general approach involved
attempted to move unskilled/disadvantaged workers into private sector
placements. Structural changes in the economy and specifically within
the manufacturing sector undercut this effort substantially. The result,
of course, was not surprising. The programs designed to raise a substan-
tial portion of low-income African-Americans from positions of economic
marginality in actuality were reduced to that level themselves. Conse-
quently, the ability of federal anti-poverty and manpower programs to
facilitate access for disadvantaged workers to mainstream labor markets
was severely impaired. With the technological rationalization of work,
even though the lower wage unskilled positions were within the capabilities
of African-American workers, the shrinking number of production jobs turned
the private sector away from making any firm commitment to support efforts
on behalf of the unemployed, disadvantaged worker of color. It was because
of the fact that there was increasing competition for a dwindling pool of
jobs that education was employed as a rationing and allocative tool. As
was presented in this chapter, educational attainment and ability to per-
form adequately clearly depended upon the nature of the work being done.
In regard to the semi- and unskilled production jobs, Newman writes:
Whatever the job sphere technological advances have generally
resulted in the need for less skill than more.... As early as
1966, studies prepared by the U.S. National Commission on
Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress showed that while the
technological change created many types of jobs, most of the new
jobs had low skill requirements. 43
There are then two effects stemming from technological innovations.
The economic effect registers as an absolute reduction in available
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opportunities and/or structural limitations placed on the options avail-
able depending upon the sector being entered. The second effect is the
further entrenchment of stratified class structures, racial and economic.
Increased competition between low-income white workers and African-American
workers heightens the tendency towards discriminatory hiring practices.
An issue raised before, but that is applicable here, identified the
widening chasm limiting transectoral and occupational mobility between
blue and decent-salaried white collar positions. The restructuring means
that with a potentially higher-paying production moving further out of
reach, and lack of skills transfer between mid-level white collar positions
and blue collar work, it becomes increasingly clear that the opportunities
and avenues for advancement for a substantial portion of the African-
American population are being foreclosed permanently. Within this context
we can see why affirmative action has tended to concentrate its efforts
within the ranks of expanding middle class white collar positions, as
opposed to also challenging the restrictions placed on low income people
of color.
Earlier chapters have attempted to outline the trends and dynamics
responsible for the marginally-based position of the mass African-
American workforce within the mainstream labor market. The task of the
next chapter is to broadly assess the implications of these trends on
the already teunous position of the African-American worker as we move
through the 80's.
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CHAPTER V
The Impending Crisis
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The evolution of particular dynamics that have had major impacts
on the growth and viability of the African-American workforce have been
appropriately outlined in previous chapters. Technology and its applica-
tion to production processes has been observed to produce effects that
are not evenly distributed throughout the socio-economic structure of the
society. In particular, the racial and economic stratification of American
society has sharpened the disenfranchising effects of technologically
transformed work processes and thereby labor markets which imperil the
advancement of the African-American worker. The following table provides
an illustration of comparative trends in occupational distribution.
TABLE 22
Employed Persons: Percent Distribution, By Occupation and Race:
1960-1978
Occupation White Black and Other1960 1970 1975 1978 1960 1970 1975 1978
White collar workers 46.6 50.8 51.7 51.8 16.1 27.9 34.7 30.2
professional, tech-
nical 12.1 14.8 15.5 15.5 4.8 9.1 11.4 11.7
managers, adminis-
trators, exc. farm 11.7 11.4 11.2 11.4 2.6 3.5 4.4 4.8
salesworkers 7.0 6.7 6.9 6.7 1.5 2.1 2.7 2.8
clerical workers 15.7 18.0 18.1 18.0 7.3 13.2 15.7 16.9
Blue-collar workers 36.2 34.5 32.4 32.9 40.1 42.2 37.4 37.2
craft and kindred
workers 13.8 13.5 13.4 13.7 6.0 8.2 8.8 8.8
operatives 17.9 17.0 14.6 14.6 20.4 23.7 20.0 20.5
nonfarm laborers 4.4 4.1 4.4 4.6 13.7 10.3 8.7 7.9
Service workers 9.9 10.7 12.3 12.3 31.7 26.0 25.8 24.1
Farm workers 7.4 4.0 3.6 3.0 12.1 3.9 2.6 2.4
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Changes in the African-American occupational distribution can be
accounted for by the combination of two primary factors. First of all,
the close to 12 percent (16.1 to 27.9) increase in African-American
white collar workers between 1960-1970 to a great degree reflects the
immediate gains resulting from the Civil Rights and urban movements of
the mid to late sixties. This shift upward consisted primarily of a
36 percent increase in professional and technical employee representa-
tion and a 50 percent increase in clerical. The period between 1970 and
1975 continued to register positive gains though not on quite the same
scale. During this period total African-American white collar represen-
tation grew by close to 7 percent with professional and technical increases
accounting for 33 percent of the growth and clerical positions accounting
for 35 percent. Between 1975 and 1978, white collar representation for
African-Americans increased by only 1.5 percent over that five year period,
with professional and technical accounting for 20 percent of the growth
margin and clerical accounting for 80 percent.
From 1960 to 1978, the total white collar increase in distribution
was 5.1 percent, as compared to the African-American figure of 20.1
percent. Prior to the Civil Rights movement an African-American worker
was 200 percent less likely to be a white collar employee; 220 percent
more likely to have been employed in the low wage service sector; and
about twice as likely to still be working on a farm. Drawing from
Chapter Two, there should be a fundamental understanding of the dispro-
portionate concentrations and their roots. So, in 1978, while slightly
over 50 percent of the white workforce was employed in white collar
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positions, a little over 60 percent of the African-American workforce
was engaged in blue collar work. Entering the 80's if craftsmen are
excluded from the blue collar category, 53 percent of the African-American
workforce is employed in a relatively low wage earning occupation. The
comparative differences are pointed out by the following table, which
exhibits income distribution for African-American and white families.
TABLE 23
Distribution of Families by Income:
2
1976 and 1977
Selected characteristics Black White
1976 1977 1976 1977
Income of families
Distribution by Income Level
All families ... thousands 5,804 5,806 50,083 50,530
Percent............. 100 100 100 100
Under $3000 9 10 3 3
$3,000 to $4,999 15 14 5 5
$5,000 to $6,999 12 13 7 7
$7,000 to $9,999 15 15 11 10
$10,000 to $11,999 8 8 7 7
$12,000 to $14,999 11 10 11 11
$15,000 to $24,999 22 21 34 33
$25,000 and over 8 9 22 24
Median Income
(Adjusted for price
$9,838 $9,563
changes in 1977 dollars)
$16,539 $16,740
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A brief overview of Table 23 shows the relative concentrations of
families within particular income ranges. We can see quite clearly that
whereas 52 percent of all African-American families are concentrated in
income brackets below $10,000 annually, 75 percent of all white families
are dispersed throughout the income brackets above $10,000 a year. Fur-
thermore, the median income for African-Americans declined by 2.7 percent
between 1976 and 1977, while the median income for white families in-
creased by 1.2 percent. By reviewing the changes in income distributions
between 1976 and 1977, it is evident that there was a shift downward,
within the lower percentiles of the African-American income categories,
while the lower percentiles of the white distribution remained stable.
Also worth noting is the counter increase within the upper ranks of the
African-American distribution during 1977 at the same time that the down-
ward shift occurred.
It is at this point that we engage the structural transformation of
the economy, from the production of goods to the production of services.
Within this formulation we also find a partial explanation for the
widening income gaps between African-Americans and whites.
In Chapter III an attempt was made to document the following trend
which can be stated as follows:
One of the dominant characteristics of development in the
advanced stages of capitalism is the ability of a reduced
number of workers to produce the required amount of goods
demanded by society as a whole.
This condition that becomes manifest in the manufacturing sector, after
a certain stage of development, is not unlike the condition in agriculture.
In the agricultural sector we witnessed the massive exodus of people from
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the land along with an incredible increase in productivity capable of
feeding the nation and providing a base for international trade and foreign
policy extortion. As it has already been stated, the dynamics within
industry follow the same basic pattern. The result generated by this
pattern of industrial development has been the growth and expansion of
the service or non-production sector.
In a formulation of the service sector, Ginzberg and Vojta identify
four basic omponents.
distributive services--wholesale and retail trade, communication,
transporation, and public untilities
producer services--accounting, legal counsel, marketing, banking,
architecture, engineering, and management consulting.
consumer services--restaurants, hotels, resorts, drycleaning,
entertainment, etc.
non-profit and government--education, health, justice system,
national defense
The itemized categories within the components are not intended to
be exhaustive, but only to provide an idea of the scope of economic
activities within each component.
The following statistics provide a framework from which to identify
the magnitude of service sector growth over the past five decades. In
1929, 45 percent of the American workforce was employed in the production
of goods. By 1977 the proportion had dropped to 32 percent. By way of
simple addition, during this same period the service sector experienced
a 13 percent increase in size with the major portion of the growth trend
accelerating after 1948. This date quite expectedly conforms with that
period usually identified as the takeoff period in American industrial
productivity. Worth noting is the correlation between the productivity
129
take-off year and the end of World War II. Improvements in wartime
or defense-oriented production processes when transferred to domestic
sector production register as increases in output per man hour for the
sector as a whole.
In 1948, the goods producing sector accounted for 46 percent of the
gross national product, while the service sector contributed one percent.
By 1978, the figure for the goods producing sector had fallen to 34
percent, while the share of GNP contributed by the service sector had
risen to 66 percent.5 In the employment arena, employment in the goods
producing sector increased by 20 percent from 1948 to 1977 (20.9 million
to 25.1 million). On the other hand, employment in the service sector
increased by 100 percent from 27.2 million to 54.4 million.6 Isolating
the goods producing sector against the manufacturing component, we note
the following. In 1948, manufacturing employment accounted for 74 percent
of the goods producing sector employment. In 1978 the related figure was
76 percent. However, of the 3.6 million increase in manufacturing employ-
ment from 15.5 million (1948) to 19.1 million (1978), three million or
83 percent of the increase in manufacturing was attributable to non-
production workers.7
Since 1967 the number of production workers in manufacturing had
declined from 14 million to 13.1 million in 1976.8 The number of laborers
in manufacturing declined by 47.2 percent between 1968 and 1970, while
the number of machinists fell by 25 percent.9 For manufacturing in
general, even though the absolute number of production workers declined,
value added increased 95 percent from 1967 to 1976. Also, assets per
employee increased by 33.8 percent during this period, with the total
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value of machinery increasing relative to the total wage bill by a
rate of 1.2:1.10
As with any sector of the labor market, it is important to avoid
monolithic categorizations that negate the existence of subsectors within
the whole. Just as dual markets exist in the industrial sector, a dual
market or in other words different levels of entry also exist within the
service sector. The primary breakdown is usually seen as a division between
white collar jobs and service jobs in the laborer occupation group. One
of the key issues then centers around the question of where workers find
employment once they have been displaced or denied entrance to jobs in
industry.
Between 1959 and 1978 total employment increased by 30 million.
Of these new jobs, 16 million were high level professional, technical,
managerial, administrative, sales and crafts occupations.11 Within the
service sector in 1959, 42.7 percent of the jobs were white collar posi-
tions, by 1978 50 percent were white collar jobs.12 Appropriate to
add to this scenario are some figures on education.
In 1948 the median year of high school completed was 10.6, by 1978
the figure had risen to 12.6. The median of school years completed for
African-Americans was 12.3. In 1948, 40 percent of the potential employees
had completed high school while only 9 percent completed college. By
1978, the figures had risen to 75 percent and 33 percent respectively. 13
Within occupational categories, the median years of schooling for the
professional and managerial occupations rose from 12.8 years in 1948
to 16.5 in 1978. For administrators, the figure was 12.2 in 1948 and
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13.4 in 1978. Moving on to the blue collar category, respective figures
show an increase from 9.0 in 1948 to 12.2 in 1978. For service workers,
the 1978 median figure is also 12.2. The issue being raised may already
be clear. 14
Referring back to James Bright in Chapter IV, it was theoretically
supported that as levels of automation increased, the demand on the worker
did not necessarily increase, but in fact decreased. On the other side of
the issue, those white collar employees involved in the planning of the
production process and creation of new labor-saving techniques are highly
scrutinized. Consequently there are certain academic prerequisities which
are expected of a potential high-level white collar employee. One pre-
requisite of course is a college degree. With the median level of schooling
for blue collar workers in general identified as 12.2 years, chances are
slim that a blue collar worker displaced from production work would be
hired into a high level white collar position. Underemployed as a
blue collar worker in another industry, displaced or rejected manufacturing
production workers must find employment in the middle to low wage service
sector.
What tends to substantiate this position are the respective service
sector figures shown in Table 22. There we see a 3.2 percent increase
in the number of whites working in what has traditionally been a racially
reserved sector. Even in 1978, African-Americans were still twice as
concentrated as the white workers.15 With a growing service sector,
which is divided between white collar and manual labor, service, etc.
occupations, the widening median income gaps between whites and African-
Americans may in part be due to the excessive concentration of African-
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American workers in the low wage service sector. It is important to
remember that the increasingly automated production processes and just
an overall accelerated pace of cybernation only serves to benefit a
certain portion of the workforce. The rest, particularly the latecomers,
get frozen out of the action.
A corollary to the structural transformation of the economy in the
advanced stages of capitalist development is the increased presence of
government as a moderating regulator of the accumulation process, on both
economic and socio-political fronts. Prime examplesof government's many
roles and functions have been presented throughout the course of this
thesis. In Chapter IV, the initial task of government was to restore
peace as quickly as possible so that the accumulation process could con-
tinue undisrupted. In a drastically reduced definitive statement, the
state is the political apparatus through which societal distortions,
resulting from the unchecked drive of the accumulation process, are re-
solved. The state is the protectorate on both domestic and international
fronts. It is upon this base that the issues characterizing the reindus-
trailization debate are brought to the forefront.
Another way of looking at the reindustrialization fix is to under-
stand the crisis in US imperialism. Part of the crisis is rooted in the
growing level of competition between the U.S. and its foreign competitors.
The result is new restrictions on domestric and international markets.
As each capitalist country displaces labor, in order to gain a com-
petitive advantage in production, it becomes necessary to solidify the
bourgeois markets of the competitive countries. A perfect example is the
case of the Japanese in the United States. The Japanese produce far more
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cars than the Japanese could sell at home through their domestin markets.
It is therefore necessary to tap the car markets in other countries.
For the U.S., this direct challenge has had direct impacts on the sol-
vency of particular elements in the auto industry. In this simplified
formulation, we can begin to identify the origins of the world over-
production crisis, triggered by the growing internal conditions of eco-
nomic crisis, and the general collapse of international trade. Labor
displacing technology begins suppressing the tandard of living for all
who are not of a priviledged class. The consequence is a decline of both
domestic and international markets. This condition is very similar to
the one cited by Mattick on a domestic or national scale. However, it
is important to understand that "reindustrialization" is as much a political
process as anything else. The following statistics are generally cited as
evidence that American industries need to be revitalized, relative to
two of its strongest competition.16
Average Age of Equipment
U.S. 16-17 years
West Germany 12 years
Japan 10 years
Private Investment in Plant and Equipment as
a Share of GNP (1970-79 average)
U.S. 10.2%
West Germany 12.6%
Japan 17.0%
Productivity Growth in Manufacturing
(average annual rate 1970-79)
U.S. 2.3%
West Germany 5.2%
Japan 5.2%
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From the statistics the politics of reindustrialization become
clear. Reindustrialization at this tage of American history carries with
it the stigma of rearmament progaganda. Nonetheless, reindustrialization
proponents will continue to harp on the U.S. productive base in an effort
to createa supportive environment for the increased public support of
industry. With a focus on productivity, the particular role and appli-
cation of the microelectronics revolution takes on a new meaning. Marx
stated quite appropriately:1
The forces of production which are further developed will
conflict evermore intensely with the existing mode of
production and tend towards its overthrow.
We also know, however, that the rate of displacement is in fact determined
by the relative strengths of capital and labor. It is the potential impact
of the microprocessor based on its demonstrated abilities that makes its
potential labor displacing effects so devastating. Referring back to
Chapter One, we know that capital is constantly on the lookout for techno-
logical rents. If one capitalist is capable of cornering a technological
innovation that substantially reduced labor costs, the impacts of that
process will be limited to his firm. However, if that same process becomes
the driving force behind production processes in not only the domestic
arena but also the international arena, the consequences for the system
as a whole, as stated earlier, are cause for great concern.
Presented now is a summary overview of the new technology. In 1960
one silicon chip was capable of performing the equivalent functions of
one transistor. In 1978, it was possible to place on one silicon chip,
measuring about one square inch, the equivalent of 100,000 transistor
functions. Today it is 250,000 transistors to the chip. It is
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anticipated by 1985 that 10,000,000 transistor functions will be placed
on one silicon chip.17 Accordingly then, it is already possible to
place on one chip all the essential circuitry of a modern computer. A
chip that is constructed with the capabilities of a computer is called a
micro-processor. The combination of a micro-processor with other chips
for memory and the control of input/output functions comprise, together,
what is called a micro-computer. To more fully cmonstrate the power of the
silicon chip technology, a comparison can be made against the earliest of
modern computers, called ENIAC, which was developed in the 1950's. The
micro-computer has more computer capacity than ENIAC. It is 20 times
faster, has a larger memory, is more reliable, occupies 1/30,000 the
space, and costs 1/10,000 as much.18
In 1961, between 10,000 and 15,000 employees produced about 520
million devices, nearly all of which were discrete transistors, diodes
and the like. By 1976, about 120,000 workers made a total of about 6
billion devices (devices averaged 50 transistors). This while the average
labor productivity measured in devices per employee did not change greatly,
measured in transistors per employee, the average labor productivity
skyrocketed. 19
It has been stated by many experts that the development of the micro-
processor is no less significant than the introduction of the assembly-
line and mass production processes. In fact some have gone so far as to
suggest that the era of automated machines producing automated machines
is near. There are a number of overriding issues encompassed by this
dynamic. Even though the potential impacts of this particular wave of
technology seem overwhelming compared with previous innovative periods,
it still follows the patterns established by previous waves. And from
136
the evidence already presented each era must be analyzed according to
the prevailing conditions at that particular point in time. Consequently
the impacts of displacement are relatively speaking generating strong
repercussions for any given era.
There does exist a special point to be made though. The first wave
of structural changes led from agriculture to industry. The second wave
from industry to the service sector. And at this, our current stage,
the cycle is characterized by varying degrees of technological ration-
alization throughout all sectors. The critical issue is, after the micro-
electronics wave has been standardized throughout all sectors, where will
the transformation of the service sector lead to?
In closing, this particular issue is of primary importance not only
to the development, but to the fundamental survival of the African-
American population in the U.nited States. Throughout this paper we have
noticed that periods of economic upheaval have always had a feedback
effect which dictated a more repressive condition for African-Americans
in particular, and people of color in general. Should the foreboding
of the potential wave of microelectronics innovations materialize on a
large scale, for African-Americans an other groups who have traditionally
been only marginal participants in mainstream structures, the issue of
development will be reduced to one of survival.
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